Cities versus Agriculture: Revisiting Intersectoral Water Transfers Potential Gains and Conflicts by unknown
ISSN 1391-9407
ISBN 92-9090-624 3
Postal Address: IWMI, P O Box 2075, Colombo, Sri Lanka   Location: 127 Sunil Mawatha, Pelawatte, Battaramulla, Sri Lanka
Telephone: +94-11 2787404, 2784080   Fax: +94-11 2786854
Email: comp.assessment@cgiar.org   Website: www.iwmi.org/assessment
Cities versus Agriculture: Revisiting Intersectoral Water Transfers, 
Potential Gains and Conflicts
François Molle and Jeremy Berkoff
Research Report 10
Figure to be inserted
I n t e r n a t i o n a l
Water  Management
I n s t i t u t e
The Comprehensive Assessment of Water Management in Agriculture takes
stock of the costs, benefits and impacts of the past 50 years of water development
for agriculture, the water management challenges communities are facing today,
and solutions people have developed. The results of the Assessment will enable
farming communities, governments and donors to make better-quality investment
and management decisions to meet food and environmental security objectives in
the near future and over the next 25 years.
The Research Report Series captures results of collaborative research conducted
under the Assessment. It also includes reports contributed by individual scientists
and organizations that significantly advance knowledge on key Assessment
questions. Each report undergoes a rigorous peer-review process. The research
presented in the series feeds into the Assessment’s primary output—a “State of
the World” report and set of options backed by hundreds of leading water and
development professionals and water users.
Reports in this series may be copied freely and cited with due
acknowledgement. Electronic copies of reports can be downloaded from the
Assessment website (www.iwmi.org/assessment).
If you are interested in submitting a report for inclusion in the series, please
see the submission guidelines available on the Assessment website or send a
written request to: Sepali Goonaratne, P.O. Box 2075, Colombo, Sri Lanka.
Comprehensive Assessment outputs contribute to the Dialogue
on Water, Food and Environment Knowledge Base.
iComprehensive Assessment Research Report 10
Cities versus Agriculture: Revisiting
Intersectoral Water Transfers, Potential
Gains and Conflicts
François Molle
and
Jeremy Berkoff
Comprehensive Assessment of Water Management in Agriculture
The authors: François Molle is a Principal Researcher at the International Water Management
Institute, Colombo, Sri Lanka, seconded from the Institut de Recherche pour le
Développement (IRD), France and Jeremy Berkoff is an Independent Economist/Water
Resources Consultant.
This report has benefited from valuable comments by Frank Rijsberman, Jan Lundqvist,
Doug Merrey, Hugh Turral, Chris Perry, David Molden and Charles Abernethy on earlier
draft versions.
Molle, F.; Berkoff, J. 2006. Cities versus agriculture: Revisiting intersectoral  water transfers,
potential gains and conflicts. Comprehensive Assessment Research Report 10. Colombo,
Sri Lanka: Comprehensive Assessment Secretariat.
/ water scarcity / water transfer / conflict / water demand / water allocation / water stress
/ water supply / water resources development / water resource management / economic
aspects / political aspects / environmental effects / irrigation / groundwater / irrigation
water / domestic water /
ISSN 1391-9407
ISBN 92-9090-624 3
ISBN 978-92-9090-624 7
Copyright © 2006, by Comprehensive Assessment Secretariat. All rights reserved.
Please send inquiries and comments to: comp.assessment@cgiar.org
The Comprehensive Assessment (www.iwmi.cgiar.org/assessment) is organized through the CGIAR’s
Systemwide Initiative on Water Management (SWIM), which is convened by the International Water
Management Institute. The Assessment is carried out with inputs from over 100 national and international
development and research organizations—including CGIAR Centers and FAO. Financial support for
the Assessment comes from a range of donors, including core support from the Governments of the
Netherlands, Switzerland and the World Bank in support of Systemwide Programs. Project-specific
support comes from the Governments of Austria, Japan, Sweden (through the Swedish Water House)
and Taiwan; Challenge Program on Water and Food (CPWF); CGIAR Gender and Diversity Program;
EU support to the ISIIMM Project; FAO; the OPEC Fund and the Rockefeller Foundation; and Oxfam
Novib.  Cosponsors of the Assessment are the: Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
(CGIAR), Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the
Ramsar Convention.
iii
iii
Contents
Summary ......................................................................................................... v
Introduction ..................................................................................................... 1
Urban Water Scarcity and Its Links to Irrigation ............................................ 3
Intersectoral Transfers .................................................................................. 12
Intersectoral Water Transfers in Practice ..................................................... 16
Are Urban Uses Constrained by Agriculture? .............................................. 24
Where Are We Heading? .............................................................................. 26
Conclusions ................................................................................................... 32
Annex ............................................................................................................. 37
Literature Cited.............................................................................................. 55

vSummary
Water demand management, or making better use
of the water we have—as opposed to augmenting
supply—is increasingly proposed as a way of
mitigating water-scarcity problems. Moving water
away from agriculture to uses with higher
economic value is one of the main measures
widely seen as desirable. Sectoral “allocation
stress” is often identified as resulting from four
different observations: a) agriculture gets the
“lion’s share” of all diverted water resources; b)
agriculture is not only the main water user but
also an activity that incurs by far the largest
wastage; c) cities are “thirsty” ; and d) water
productivity in nonagricultural sectors is far higher
than in agriculture. This apparent misallocation is
often attributed to the failure of the government to
allocate water rationally.
This report revisits this commonly-accepted
wisdom and examines the nature of urban water
scarcity, the relative importance of both physical
and economic scarcity, and how cities secure
funds for the development of their water
infrastructure (or fail to do so). It investigates
whether recurrent water shortages in cities have
anything to do with agricultural water use (or
overuse); and assesses whether significant
allocation stresses warrant the view that large
economic gains can be realized through
reallocation.
A large number of cities worldwide are
reviewed and the ways in which they increase
their water supply is analyzed. It is shown that, in
many cases, augmentation of supply is achieved
through transfers of water from agriculture, or
from ecological reserves and aquifers. Transfers
may be gradual or outright, minor or major,
surreptitious or open, above the surface or
underground, and with or without compensation,
all factors that condition the perceptions and
reactions of the general public. If cities eventually
tap additional resources, this is often found to
happen in a nonsustainable or costly manner. In
general, rather than using a narrow criterion of
financial costs, cities tend to go for the “path of
least resistance,” whereby economic, social and
political costs are considered in conjunction.
Problems of urban water scarcity are
sometimes compounded by the physical
environment (arid climate) or by the location of
cities in upper catchments where no large
streams are available nearby. However, most
large cities in the developing world tend to have
deficient-to-poor water supply and sanitation
facilities, even if there is abundant water in their
surroundings. As shown by the debate on
financing of water-supply infrastructure, the main
issue is “where to find the money?” rather than
“where to find the water?” It is shown that urban
water supply is a reflection of the local political
economy where the “threat from below” (voice of
civil society, popular unrest, epidemics, etc.,) the
financial and political benefits accruing to the
elites and decision makers, and the possibility to
tap financial resources (through privileged
relations with the central government or
international funding agencies) largely determine
the level of water services and how these are
spatially and socially differentiated.
If city dwellers often have precarious supply
and sanitation facilities, there is no strong
evidence to show that nonagricultural (notably
industrial) economic activities are significantly
constrained by a lack of water, both in their daily
functioning and in their capacity to expand.
Sectoral water allocation may be hindered where
formal water rights systems exist (e.g., the prior
appropriation right system in the western USA)
but much less so where allocation is centrally
administered. Contrary to common knowledge,
States, when not going for supply augmentation,
have consistently given priority to cities and
nonagricultural activities, and the large economic
gains anticipated for intersectoral transfers appear
to be greatly overstated. Agricultural water may
have an opportunity cost at the margin, but this
margin is usually very thin and transient.
vi
Water-demand management is highly
desirable and, in many cases, is a priority for
water managers but, though its impact may be
significant, its potential is still fairly limited over
the medium-term. Transfers of water to uses of
higher economic value are occurring and will
undoubtedly continue. Rather than minimizing or
concealing their effect, planners should
acknowledge that highly committed water
systems will have to cope with growing
uncertainty and fluctuations in supply:
contingency planning should allow for short-term
transfers, with compensation to those
surrendering supplies planned in advance so as
to avoid upheavals and water crises. Such
transfers neither preclude nor require water
markets. But markets have prerequisites that are
unlikely to be met in most countries and the
alternative of transfers administered and designed
through processes of negotiation is likely to
predominate. More generally, better access to
hydrological data, improved control over hydraulic
regulation, multi-stakeholder platforms or other
arenas for achieving common goals, and patterns
of governance which include empowerment of
marginalized social/ethnic groups and
representation of all interested parties in
allocation and decision making, have the potential
for ensuring fairer and smoother reallocation of
water.
1Introduction
Handling these conflicts and the sectoral re-
balancing that is implied are a major concern of
the literature. Many believe that better use can be
made of the resources at our disposal: that water
is too often devoted to economically inefficient,
low return (usually agricultural) uses and that
reallocation to more efficient, high return (usually
urban) uses would increase total economic
welfare. Others consider that human uses have
been satisfied at unacceptable cost to the
environment and that this must be redressed.
Associated with issues of value are questions
related to the mechanisms of effecting transfers
to optimize value (however value is determined).
What mix of political, administrative and market
mechanisms is to be preferred and under what
conditions? And how far and in what ways should
the resultant mix be regulated to ensure that
transfers are achieved in an efficient and
effective manner?
Sectoral reallocation is seen by many
observers as one pillar of water demand
management, defined as making better use of
existing available resources, as opposed to
supply augmentation options. Significant
economic gains are anticipated from a “soft path”
approach that includes various conservation
measures, technological innovations, and
changes in user behavior through education or
economic incentives. Reallocation appears as a
macro-economic necessity expected to yield
gains in aggregate welfare. This report is not
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In a sense all water is used, all water has
value: a pristine river as well as a river that
has been fully controlled and developed to
serve direct human purposes. But as
populations expand, human uses increasingly
encroach on the values of undisturbed nature,
and shifts occur in the intersectoral balance,
between nature and human uses and among the
differing human uses.
Typically, human communities need small
amounts of water for domestic and industrial uses
and much larger amounts for irrigated agriculture,
at least in dry areas and for paddy rice. This at
first poses a few problems. Water is diverted for
human uses and environmental impacts are, at
least initially, seldom regarded as a problem.
Increasingly, however, as irrigation diversions rise,
they alter and displace natural uses; and as cities
and economies expand, domestic, industrial and
in-stream uses also start to impinge on the
quantity, quality and timing of water flows, not
only for the environment but also for existing and
potential agricultural uses. Conflicts among and
between environmental and human uses intensify,
and mechanisms – some planned, many
unplanned – emerge to rebalance sectoral
allocations. In many river basins, water resource
development has by now reached – or exceeded
– its limits; marginal additional sources provide
only very costly alternatives; and new projects
reallocate water already appropriated for human or
crucial environmental use.
2intended to address the whole issue of sectoral
allocation. Rather, it endeavors to throw light on
important aspects of the discussion regarding
transfers of water between rural and urban users
under conditions of scarcity. It seeks to address
the following questions:
• What is the nature of urban water scarcity?
Are there significant differences between
physical scarcity and economic scarcity? Are
poor Water Supply and Sanitation (WS&S)
conditions due to lack of availability of water?
• How, in practice, do cities secure additional
water supplies, and how is water transferred
from agriculture to cities? What kinds of
transfers are commonly found, on what
grounds are they decided, what costs are
incurred in effecting such transfers, and how
do interested parties react to them?
• Are cities – their inhabitants on the one hand
and nonagricultural activities on the other –
constrained by a lack of water, both in their
daily functioning and in their capacity to
expand?
• Have recurrent water shortages in cities
anything to do with agricultural water use (or
overuse)? If so, are there significant
allocation stresses that suggest that large
economic gains can be realized through
reallocation?
• More generally, what is the way forward? And
how can we ensure a synergetic rather than
an antagonistic rural-urban nexus, with cities
obtaining supplies at minimum and
acceptable cost to agriculture?
The report is anchored in an annex that
examines how cities round the world have in
practice acquired water. While direct conflicts
between urban and rural interests characterize
some of the case studies presented (Ta’iz in
Yemen being an extreme example), the empirical
evidence suggests that, by-and-large, cities have
been able to obtain supplies, often at greater cost
than is necessary but without significantly
compromising their ability to expand and prosper,
even in most inauspicious locations. Where
citizens face shortages or any other water
problem, the report argues that this is
predominantly due to development and financing
constraints rather than to water shortages as
such. Under conditions of scarcity, any transfers
to cities will probably have some adverse impact
on agriculture. However, the volume transferred is
typically small and, though important social and
equity issues arise, it is argued that farmers can
often adjust. And where the environment is
adversely affected by human impacts, this is
predominantly an issue between the environment
and agriculture and not between the environment
and cities, at least in regard to water quantity.
The section titled “Urban Water Scarcity and
Its Links to Irrigation” sets the scene by
reviewing what is meant by urban water scarcity
and its links to irrigation, investigating its
physical, political and economic dimensions. The
section titled “Intersectoral Transfers” categorizes
different types of transfers and transfer
mechanisms. In the light of this typology, the
section titled “Intersectoral Water Transfers in
Practice” discusses how transfers are effected in
practice with reference to the empirical evidence
in the annex. The section titled “Are Urban Uses
Constrained by Agriculture?” seeks to answer the
question: are urban uses in practice constrained
by agriculture. And, finally, the section titled
“Where Are We Heading?” discusses some ways
ahead and the conclusion summarizes the
report’s main findings.
3Conventional and Alternative
Explanatory Frameworks
Economics has been defined as the “application
of reason to choice” in the use of scarce
resources (Green and Newsome 1992). That
water is an economic – i.e., a scarce – good was
reiterated at the 1992 Dublin and Rio
conferences, and demand management has been
widely promoted as a primary means of resolving
the alleged water crisis (Frederick 1993; Hamdy
et al. 1995; Winpenny 1997; Brooks 1997).
Demand management is defined as a “policy that
stresses making better use of existing supplies,
rather than developing new ones” (Winpenny
1997). It employs a variety of measures,
including price incentives, market mechanisms,
quotas, subsidies, conservation, treatment, re-
cycling, awareness-raising and education. For
Gleick (2003) such efforts together with
decentralization and user participation define a
“soft path” approach. Pricing and markets to
balance supply and demand have received
particular attention (Rosegrant and Binswanger
1994; Bhatia et al. 1994; Tsur and Dinar 1995;
Thobani 1997; Dinar and Subramanian 1997;
Easter et al. 1998; Johansson 2000).
Making better economic use of water implies
emphasis on its productivity and the economic
welfare to be derived from alternate uses. The
World Bank’s (1993) policy paper remarks that
the value of water differs greatly between
agriculture and other sectors, “often indicating
gross misallocations if judged by economic
criteria … Setting prices at the right level is not
enough; prices need to be paid if they are to
enhance the efficient allocation of resources.”
Price and market mechanisms are thus not only
presented as a means of cost recovery and
demand regulation but also as a way to reallocate
water towards higher-value uses. Misallocation is
held to be a manifestation of poor water
management resulting in economic inefficiency.
Dinar (1998), for example, holds that: “the
potential for economic benefits from allocation-
oriented institutional change are not only
substantial but also increasing with each increase
in water scarcity.” Rosegrant and Cline (2002)
posit that: “there is considerable scope for water
savings and economic gains through water
reallocation to higher-value uses.” And, Merrett
(2003) states that: “in the field of water resources
management a widely held belief exists that
allocation stress is to be found in many parts of
the world.” The apparent strength of this argument
is predicated on four interconnected assertions:
1. That agriculture gets the “lion’s share” of
all diverted water resources (70% at world
level: much more (80–95%) in developing
countries);
2. That agricultural use incurs large
wastage, typified by ubiquitous
statements to the effect that two-thirds of
water delivered to agriculture fails to
reach the crop or that irrigation efficiency
is typically 30-40 percent;
3. That the value of water in nonagricultural
sectors is much higher than in
agriculture, typically by an order of
magnitude; and
4. That cities are frequently water short, the
situation varying greatly depending on
climate, resource availability, economic
development, etc. Reference is made to
cities that ration supplies or fail to
guarantee water pressure, either
permanently or during dry spells, and to
urban areas with precarious or
nonexistent water supply facilities.
Urban Water Scarcity and Its Links to Irrigation
4The juxtaposition of these four statements is
said to provide a straightforward case that water
is misallocated (ADB 20001), with two corollaries.
First, responsibility for this is attributed to the
State, since it is generally observed that the
State allocates water through centralized
management. This assumed failure prompts
proposals for pricing and market mechanisms as
an alternative (Holden and Thobani 1996;
Anderson and Snyder 1997; Dinar 1998;
Rosegrant and Cline 2002). Second, the
contrasting share of water used in agriculture with
that in other uses suggests that a relatively
limited level of water saving in agriculture would
easily make up for the additional needs of the
urban sector. This is well exemplified by Gleick
(2001) who states that: “The largest single
consumer of water is agriculture – and this use is
largely inefficient … as much as half of all water
diverted for agriculture never yields any food.
Thus, even modest improvements in agricultural
efficiency could free huge quantities of water.”2
The above four statements imply that urban
scarcity is in large part due to excessive use of
water in the rural sector and to state failure to
reallocate water. In other words, irrigation
profligacy and bureaucratic inertia help explain
urban shortage. Solutions lie, in part, in demand
management in the urban sector but more
fundamentally in the improvement of efficiency in
agricultural use. Substantial water can be freed
and used in higher value uses, reducing the
allocation stress for the common good. Water
markets may be instrumental in such reallocation
and avoid state failure. This line of reasoning is
schematized in the upper half of figure 1.
This framework presents us with a riddle: if
large economic benefits are waiting to be realized
by shifting water out of agriculture through
marginal improvements in irrigation efficiency why
do reallocation and related improvements seem
so problematic? Why have governments failed to
recognize these benefits, especially in contexts
where urban bias is pervasive? While not
necessarily discarding all the tenets of the
conventional framework (e.g., irrigation might
become more efficient and markets might be
effective tools in some contexts), we propose an
alternative explanatory framework which critiques
some of the causal links implicit in the
conventional framework and which shifts
emphasis to the political economy of WS&S.
Under competition from other sectors, agriculture
invariably adjusts and basin efficiency increases;
transfers do occur in multiple ways and such
transfers keep allocative stress low. Attention is
directed to the induced displacement of nature
and to environmental costs, and to devising
better regulation of these transfers, with emphasis
on temporary transfers and issues of
compensation. This framework is summarized in
the lower half of figure 1.
1ADB’s (2000) paper “Water in the 21st century” illustrates this view well: “Irrigation is particularly voracious, accounting for up to 80
percent of water demand in hot dry regions … Major obstacles to the rational reallocation of water among users, however, are the
legal and regulatory constraints on water transfers and, in many countries, the complex systems of water rights that inhibit the free
movement of water as an economic good.” Another example of the alignment of agricultural wastage and urban water scarcity is
given by the WWC (World Water Commission) (2000): “In many public irrigation systems only 30 percent of water supplied is actually
used by plants. This is unacceptable when half of the people of the developing world live on less than US $2 a day—and when more
than 1 billion people have no access to clean water and 2 billion lack adequate sanitation.”
2These points are repeated in countless publications. Winpenny (1997) states that: “The fact that agriculture is such a dominant and,
by many accounts, a profligate user of water has led many people to believe that relatively small savings in its water use would be
easy to achieve.” The International River Network (IRN 2003) considers that there is: “tremendous potential for water savings” and
believes that “reducing the water consumed by irrigation by 10 percent could double the amount of water available for domestic
supply worldwide.” For Simon (1998) “Transferring 5 percent of agricultural water to urban areas would solve urban needs for the next
25 years.” See also Schiffler (1998), Postel (2001) and Rogers et al. (2000) who believe that “a small increase in the fees charged for
irrigation water … should release sufficient water resources to meet anticipated urban deficits.”
5FIGURE 1.
Schematization of Conventional and Alternative Explanatory Frameworks.
6Some Limitations of the Conventional
Framework
Three tenets of the conventional framework are
briefly discussed here and some of their
weaknesses are shown.
Most water is used by irrigation. To stress that
agriculture gets the lion’s share implicitly
establishes a causal relationship between its
large share and the allegedly unfulfilled needs of
nonagricultural sectors. But irrigated agriculture is
a biophysical process that inherently needs a lot
of water. In most cases, if practiced, irrigation
requires much more water than other consumptive
uses.3 Moreover, agriculture’s share is typically
dominant when the needs of other activities –
apart from those of the environment – have still
to compete for comparable amounts. This has
been aggravated by the fact that States have
invested massively in subsidized irrigation
development for a host of socioeconomic and
political reasons.4 Where other human uses do, in
fact, compete for significant amounts, the
balance shifts and irrigation almost always
becomes the residual human use after other
needs have been met. To keep with animal
metaphors, the lion’s share is perhaps better
described as the “hyena’s share.” (In many
cases, however, agriculture will compensate for
this loss by reusing wastewater [e.g., Israel or
Jordan] and/or by displacing nature, which can
thus be seen as the ultimate residual user; this
will be discussed later).
Furthermore, irrigation designs are such that
they can often utilize flood flows and other
marginal sources that cannot provide the level of
dependability required by domestic and industrial
users. Irrigation thus typically uses a lot of water
at times when it has no alternative use. In other
cases, irrigation and urban networks are
disconnected hydraulically and transfers are either
impracticable or the costs of storage and/or
integration are prohibitively expensive.
Farmers waste water. Irrigation’s dominant share
appears consistent with the conventional belief
that farmers waste water — are not large
consumers (necessarily) squanderers? The
alleged wastage in irrigation has been the
subject of a large amount of literature, and
decision-makers and the media worldwide
continue to refer to classical irrigation
inefficiency in order to stress alleged
mismanagement or to justify interventions of one
sort or another. Without entering into the details
of this question, it is important to emphasize
that waste is relative: if water has no other
economic use and, is not scarce, then wastage
is of little concern other than for any impacts it
has on the environment. During the rainy season
or in surplus river basins, low irrigation efficiency
is thus typically neither here nor there. This is
notably the case for supplementary wet season
irrigation in Asia, where a large part of the
diverted water comes from (excess) runoff that
has no other alternative human use.
Even in water short basins, a loss at one
point typically flows back to the river or an
aquifer and – subject to water quality – can be
recycled downstream (Frederiksen 1992; Burt
1995; Keller et al. 1996; Perry 1999; Molden and
Sakthivadivel 1999; Molle and Turral 2004; Molle
et al. 2004). Efficiency at basin-level is typically
much higher than within any individual use.
Wasteful practices that result in true losses to
the system occur but are not the general rule.
Moreover, if real irrigation wastage occurs within a
water-short basin, it is usually because of poor
internal scheme management rather than because
of excessive overall endowment. The issue is
thus one of management, not allocation.
3Water to satisfy basic food requirement is in the order of ten times larger than our basic need for domestic water, and in the order of
500 times larger than our need for water to drink (Abernethy 2005).
4Irrigation has been widely promoted as a tool to deal with food insecurity, rural poverty, unemployment and regional development.
Along with its rent-seeking and pork-barrel dimensions, this has frequently resulted in the overbuilding of irrigation systems and the
commitment of much of the available water resources (Molle 2004).
7In addition to the water balance per se there
are issues related to design and farmer behavior.
In contrast to urban systems, irrigation systems
are designed for a level of water constraint, if for
no other reason than to limit capital cost. This
restricts the water that can be diverted during wet
periods. Full use can normally be made during
dry periods but water is inherently scarce at such
times. Design scarcity is aggravated – and
scarcity becomes pervasive – as a basin
develops and less water becomes available.
Irrigation managers and farmers respond to
physical scarcity to optimize water’s value to
them – adjusting crops, practices and calendars,
and developing conjunctive use by digging wells
and installing pumps (Molle 2004b; Loeve et al.
2003). Except in fully controlled on-demand
systems – the exception rather than the rule –
the stochastic and varying nature of water supply
means that the hidden hand of scarcity provides
both real time and longer-term incentives for
efficient water use. As a radical driver of change,
scarcity is typically much more effective than any
conceivable price mechanism though changes in
behavior induced by scarcity are often
overlooked. In contrast, urban systems are
designed for water on-demand and pricing is
critical if water use is to be constrained.
Low water productivity in agriculture. Urban water
uses usually have higher value to society than
irrigation uses, and this is reflected in the priority
typically given to domestic – and often industrial
– uses both in practice and in law. But this can
be presented in misleading terms, either because
water does not really constitute a production
factor or because like is not compared with like.
According to Gleick (2001), for instance,
“supporting 100,000 high-tech California jobs
requires some 250 million gallons of water a year;
the same amount of water used in the agriculture
sector sustains fewer than 10 jobs – a stunning
difference.” He sees a shift from the latter to the
former as providing tremendous gains in efficiency
as if they were really in competition.5 A farm laborer
cannot readily be transformed into a high-tech
worker and, even if this was possible, the market
determines demand and supply. Such examples are
presumably meant to support the necessity of
shifting water out of agriculture. But there is no
indication that high-tech industry is ever short of
water and it is equivocal to suggest it competes
with agriculture. No doubt some industries are
significant consumptive users or pollute flows to the
extent that they are unusable. But in only a few
cases is water a significant industrial cost and it is
misleading to express total added value in terms of
returns to a single factor.6 Profit-maximizing
industries control water costs as they control the
costs of any other item, but in practice industry is
driven by other far more important considerations
and, if generally profitable, almost invariably
secures the water it needs.
These elements suggest that the concepts of
allocation efficiency and productivity used in the
conventional framework need qualification. The
next section examines the causal link between
urban water scarcity and agricultural uses by
exploring the nature of this scarcity.
Urban Water Scarcity
Two questions are examined here. First, is urban
water scarcity due to physical scarcity and what
are its financial and political dimensions? Second,
how are decisions to develop water supply
infrastructures made, and how who pays for water
is defined?
5Gleick (2003) also uses US GNP, which although “an imperfect measure of economic well-being provides a consistent way to begin to
evaluate the economic productivity of water use” and divides it by total water diversions to show how “water productivity” has increased
with time.
6A concept of productivity that divides gross output value by water volume runs into contradictions. For example, applying better
fertilizers can increase water productivity, which is not very meaningful (Abernethy 2005).
8Physical and Economic Water Scarcity
Is urban water supply constrained by a physical
lack of water? According to Camdessus and
Winpenny (2003) “The root cause ‘of poor water
supply to the population’ is our negligence and
our resignation in the face of inequality.” The
“Camdessus Report” is a follow-up of the World
Water Vision and reiterates its conclusion that the
crux is money, not the physical availability of
water. The recurring question is: where are we
going to find the money? Not, where are we going
to find the water? Likewise, the World Water
Assessment Program (WWAP) report does not
refer to physical water scarcity as a problem, let
alone an agriculture-based one (UNESCO 2003).
Anton’s (1995) review of water supply in Latin
American and Caribbean cities refers to rising
cost and distance in mobilizing surface water, the
decay and siltation of reservoirs, degradation of
urban networks, a lack of incentives for water
saving, contamination of surface and groundwater
etc., and addresses the financial implications of
supplying cities but its conclusions make no
reference to a link between agricultural use and
the situation in the cities.
This suggests that the root cause is
economic rather than physical scarcity, even if
the latter may compound the former. Precarious
or underdeveloped infrastructure reflects a lack
of funds and political will. As stressed by
Camdessus and Winpenny (2003) “All
governments, agreeing on the importance of
water, subscribe to internationally inspired
commitments and undertakings. But their
spending performance is at odds with their
rhetoric: in most countries the water sector is
given a disproportionately small share in the
budget.” The capital needed for infrastructural
development varies widely but the central
question is – unambiguously – who is to pay?
The loose causal link between physical water
availability and actual supply is supported by the
fact that water-short cities have often been faced
with insufficient supply throughout their history,
regardless of size. In 1975, Amman had a
population of 600,000 but only 64 l/day available
per capita (Darmame 2004). The population has
grown threefold since then yet the per capita use
has only doubled. Athens’s per capita supply at
the start of the nineteenth century was a mere 32
l/day. Scarcity has been a recurring feature in the
story of Guayaquil’s growth in the last 150 years,
from 25,000 to 3 million inhabitants (Swyngedouw
2003). São Paulo, Brazil, has faced problems of
water supply right throughout its history (Ducrot et
al. 2003). Likewise, there is no shortage of large
cities in water-abundant regions with deficient
water supply and sanitation systems: e.g., Lagos
(Olukoya 2004) and Calcutta, with their
contaminated sources, dilapidated networks and
limited treatment and distribution. Bangladesh is
another country with abundant water, yet a total
of 2.5 million people in the slums of Dhaka are
said to suffer from very precarious provision of
water and sanitation (UNESCO 2003).7 Ho Chi
Minh City has quite abundant sources of water,
but only 44 percent of the people have piped
water connections to their homes and service is
intermittent in 25 percent of the service area
(McIntosh 2003).
Low per capita supply is often taken as a
mark of water scarcity. Numerous cities provide
water only one or two days per week, conveying
a sense of sheer deprivation. Yet, Amman, for
example, with its one-day-a-week delivery, still
consumes 135 l/c/day, even if Amman East – the
poorer area – uses 75 l/c/day (Darmame 2004).
Intermittent supply is at least in part due to a
concern for limiting the leakage that would result
from constant pressure and is resolved by
storage at the household level (Decker 2004).
Briscoe (1999) reports that in Chennai, if supply
was to increase from about 2 hours per day at 2
m of pressure to 12 hours a day at 10 m of
pressure, leakage would amount to about 900
million l/c/day or three times the current total
7However, official statistics in Bangladesh report that 99 percent of people in Dhaka have “access to water.” This points to the difficulty
of establishing consensual standards on what is such access and in defining water supply with all its components of water quality and
regularity in delivery. Collignon and Vézina’s (2000) survey of ten African cities suggests that official figures are either inflated or
correspond to total coverage (all types of supply considered).
9supply! Moreover, average values obscure the
level of disparities in access to water within the
same city, and how this access is linked to
affluence. Amman has been noted above. In
Chennai, supply is 68 l/c/day but at times of
shortage this may be halved and some areas
relying on tankers receive as little as 8 l/c/day
(Brisset 2003; Weber 2001). In Ahmedabad, 25
percent of the population consumed 90 percent of
the water while 75 percent consumed 10 percent.
In Calcutta, slum areas received 80 l/c/day, while
non-slum areas were supplied 240 l/c/day (UNDP
1998). Phoenix in arid Arizona, with average
consumption of more than 1,000 l/c/day, has
satellite towns like Paradise Valley where
consumption is over 1,600 l/c/day (Copenhaver
2003).
Another issue is the way standards are
defined. A figure of 200 – even 275 l/c/day – is
often considered such a standard8 (Salameh
2000). In contrast Gleick (1996) considers 50 l/c/
day as a minimal domestic supply, and the
Global Water Supply and Sanitation 2000
Assessment Report suggests that reasonable
access should be broadly defined as “the
availability of at least 20 liters per person per day
from a source within one kilometer of the user’s
dwelling” (UNESCO 2003), a figure also adopted
by WHO-UNICEF (2000). Yet, The Hague is
managing with 102 1/c/day, Barcelona with 127 1/
c/day, Rome with 176 1/c/day, and Moroccan
cities with between 70-100 l/c/day (IWA 2004).
Malé, capital of the Maldives, relies on
desalinated water and consumption is 34 l/c/day
though supply is available 24-hours of the day
and is reliable (McIntosh 2003). Low figures tend
to be associated with less-than-ideal water
conditions, but it is often difficult to distinguish
between core needs, comfort, superfluity, excess
and waste.
Cities in arid settings understandably run out
of water in their immediate vicinity and must opt
for costly and distant transfers. Indeed, many
cities have developed in the wrong place and are
chronically short of water (Winpenny 1994).
Chennai, Mexico City, Las Vegas and Amman,
are cities that have mushroomed despite limited
nearby water resources. Ta’iz grew between
1986–1994 at 7.9 percent despite being one of
the most water-stressed cities in the world.
Likewise, even in wet environments, needs may
outstrip nearby resources if the city is located
high in a catchment, e.g., São Paulo, Atlanta,
Kuala Lumpur, Coimbatore and Hyderabad.
Though located by the sea, Manila has long
resorted to interbasin transfer. New York and
Boston9 both had to go further afield to secure
water supplies. Some cities destroy local water
sources as they expand, e.g., Bangalore, which
has encroached on 181 of its 262 tanks (Aiyar
2003). More generally, cities in developing
countries have been unable to keep pace with
inward migration (Lundqvist et al. 2003). As
population rises physical structures to collect,
convey and dispose of water become more costly
and financial requirements may be beyond what
the cities can afford.
Of course, many cities are faced with
intermittent crises. Such crises ,in general, have
roots in hydrological vagaries and extreme
climatic events but may be compounded by
careless management, lax planning, abusive
consumption patterns, and the intervention of
politicians, whose actions are fostered by a
transient illusion of abundance (the 1989-1991
crisis in Athens, in Kaika - 2003, the 1992-1995
drought in Seville, in del Moral - 1998).
In sum, two aspects of urban water scarcity
appear to have greater salience, albeit with great
variability: the lack of available resources around
8Salameh (2000) considers that “it has been established in developed societies that 1,000 m3 per year, or about 275 liters of water
per capita per day are required for domestic purposes, including hygiene, commerce, and reasonable losses in water nets due to
leakage.” However, the sheer discrepancies in both the standards proposed and the water used in practice in diverse cities show that
the debate is not yet closed (see Feitelson and Chenoweth 2002; Meinzen-Dick and Appasamy 2002; Molle and Mollinga 2003).
9New York relied on local supplies until 1842, and then brought water from the Croton river basin, 75 km away. Between 1907 and
1927 it transferred water from two creeks in the Catskill mountains, and later, between 1937 and 1965, tapped three upper tributaries
of the Delaware river (Fitzhugh and Richter 2004).
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megalopolises and the difficulty to catch up with
the booming population; the financial aspect of
precarious WS&S conditions (especially to the
poor), which takes us to the more general
question of the political economy of urban water
supply.
The Political Economy of Urban Water Supply
The Camdessus Report and other documents
(Rijsberman 2004; UNESCO 2003; Rogers et al.
2000; Smets 2004) give varying estimates of the
financial resources needed to meet Millennium
Development Goals targets or bring urban WS&S
services up to standard.10 Leaving aside the
definition of “need” (see above), these amounts are
not usually per se beyond the financial capacity of
consumers, countries and international institutions.
The question is rather: are such investments a
priority, and who is to pay?
Are WS&S Investments A Priority? Incentives to
decision makers include the pressures to do
something (push) and the benefits accruing to
them (pull). Historically, extension of WS&S
facilities beyond the affluent classes in Europe
can be attributed not just to technical advances
and the hygienist movement but also to the need
“to preserve order, cleanliness and a healthy
workforce” (Goubert 1986), and to the perceived
“threat from below” (Chaplin 1999). As early as
the mid-eighteenth century it was argued that
“prevention of further environmental degradation
was cheaper and more effective for society than
continuing with expenditure on poor relief”
(Chaplin 1999). Swyngedouw (2003) describes
changes in Guayaquil, Ecuador, attributing
bourgeoisie response to threats from the urban
proletariat to aesthetical and physical-sanitary
concerns of the late nineteenth century. Bennett
(1995) also describes how widespread public
protests in Monterrey elevated neighborhood
problems to city problems, which even went up to
the level of national concern, thus prompting
massive government-funded infrastructure. In
contrast, Chaplin (1999) attributes the dreary
situation in India to a failure by the upper classes
to put pressure on the Government to implement
preventive and sanitation policies. Antibiotics and
pesticides confine epidemics to slums, while the
reservoir of unskilled informal workers leads to
the “commodification” of labor rather than to trade
unions that fight for better conditions.
When examining positive incentives, it is
useful to distinguish between investment in
WS&S facilities (pipes, sewers, fixing leakage
etc.,) and those that augment supply (reservoirs,
aqueducts, tunnels etc.,). The former benefit only
the population concerned whereas the latter are
more visible, benefit the whole population, and
are seen as concrete responses to the looming
shortage, thus bringing political rewards as well.
Moreover, they provide notorious opportunities for
kickbacks; and are supported by line agencies
that have financial and/or professional incentives
to push for costly investment in increasingly
distant transfers,11 though in other cases utility
staff, officials and/or politicians derive informal
revenues from water vendors and seek to
preserve the status quo (McIntosh 2003; URC
2004 for the case of Karachi).
10The Camdessus Report (2003) refers to actual needs of US$75 billion per year, increasing to US$180 billion in 2025. Hecht (2004)
estimates that after a peak in the mid-90s, investments have dropped to US$ 8 billion per year.
11Shower’s (2002) study of African cities shows that primary sources of supply in the 1970s were springs, wells and boreholes. With
time, the sources of water have tended to be increasingly distant: Johannesburg draws water from nine rivers, including from the
distant Lesotho; Tripoli is now dependent on the 600-km Great Man-Made River that brings fossil water from the Sahara Desert.
Between the 1970s and the 1990s dependence upon nearby rivers decreased from 62 percent to 42 percent, while the use of rivers
farther than 25 km away increased from 39 percent to 58 percent. Inter-basin water transfers have become commonplace and have
increased from 43 percent to 54 percent of river users, while dependence on more than one river increased from 24 percent to 38
percent.
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Who will pay represents a second dimension.12
The privatization debate can be analyzed in terms
of the state shifting the burden to citizens; and of
multinational operators shifting water supply from
the public to the private sphere.13 If society is
receptive to privatization, this can be achieved,
as in the UK. Cities in the South are under
considerable pressure from aid agencies to
privatize their water utilities but outcomes at best
have been mixed. Because of the risks involved
and the weak financial returns, these long-term
investments are unlikely to attract massive
private capital (SIWI 2004). If this option is not
politically feasible14, then Public-Private-
Partnerships are possible or the money must
come from public coffers or foreign aid and
loans.15 Some cities are able to attract funds from
donors and financing institutions e.g., due to
international subsidies (e.g., EU funds for
Athens), to geopolitical context (e.g., Amman), or
in the context of broader reconstruction (e.g.,
Phnom Penh).
The capacity of city managers and politicians
to fund investment is closely linked to a city’s
location within the state/region/nation, both in
geographical and in political terms. Capital cities
are more likely to get access to public funds.
Mexico’s federal district has a stronger fiscal
basis than the poorer constituent municipalities.
While the former benefits from central funds, the
latter may be unable to make the investments
needed, though these may be eased by political
affiliations and/or convergence of interests with
the centre (Connolly 1999). How taxes are
distributed among administrative layers – central
to local government – is key. Saravanan and
Appasamy (2001) recount how water supply in
colonial Coimbatore reflected a conflict between
local bodies and the state government on who
should pay. Swyngedouw’s study (2003) on
Guayaquil shows how the level of investment
corresponded to successive cocoa, banana and
oil booms.16 During the oil boom of the 1970s, the
State – as owner of the resource – became
central to the struggle to release resources to
finance city expansion. A similar tale is recounted
by Bennett (1995) in her study on Monterrey:
evolving relationships between federal and state
government line agencies, private-sector interest
groups, international banks and the civil society
determined whether investments were made or
not, who paid for them, and what sources of
water were to be tapped. Again, Chennai was
promised 142 Mm3 of water from the Krishna river
when the same party (Congress) ruled the three
states concerned, a promise only partly fulfilled
as political configurations changed
(Mohanakrishnan 2003).
Cost allocation for water treatment follows
similar patterns. Societies perhaps react more to
extreme environmental degradation than to
uneven or deficient water supply. Popular
12Rijsberman (2004) believes that “a crude analysis concluded that the bulk of both current and future financing comes, and will have
to come, from domestic public and private funding, not international financing through development aid. It estimated that 80-90
percent of current funding in the water sector comes from domestic funding, with the bulk coming from public investments” (Cosgrove
and Rijsberman 2000; GWP 2000). Financing of water services has been historically varied. Swyngedouw et al. (2002) for example,
show that urban water supply systems have gone through four different phases: from small private companies, through municipalization,
central state intervention (infrastructure), to an embryonic yet not unchallenged trend towards privatization.
13Privatization of utilities in the UK, for example, may have been consistent with the ideology of the Thatcher government but it was
made pressing by the huge looming financial burden entailed by the need to overhaul dilapidated old urban networks (Bakker 2000)
and to meet the quality standards imposed by EU directives.
14For example, Alcazar et al. (2002) show how privatization of water utilities in Lima was eventually forgone by the Fujimori government
in the late 1990s because the issue had become a political liability: necessary investments would have sent prices to unacceptable
heights, to the detriment of Fujimori’s main constituency and without generating cash income for the state’s coffers (as in the case of
electricity and telecommunications).
15The conjunction of the pressure put on development banks to show that their action alleviates poverty, with the setting up of the
Millennium Goals for water and sanitation may increase the willingness of the international funding agencies to support a growth in
the investment in WS&S.
16Convergence of interest between Quito and the coastal bourgeoisie during the cocoa boom, when the city enjoyed exceptional
WS&S by the-then standards, was in part broken during the banana boom. Social unrest in the 1950s, along with banana rents and
foreign loans, warranted investment but this failed to keep pace with city expansion.
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pressure often forces governments into taking
remedial actions, as in Brazil and Mexico (see
below). In response to public concerns, the US
Congress allocated federal funds to cleaning up
of a top list of 3,000 contaminated sites (Sampat
2000; Gotlieb 1988). After cases of pollution hit
the media, the Government of India funded the
Ganga Action Program in the 1980s, although the
funding of its continuation was hotly debated
(Narain 1999). These examples show that popular
pressure can force the state to change its priorities
and to face the costs incurred. As a second step,
states often try to share or shift costs.
It may appear that the US$50 billion allegedly
needed each year to bring water to those still
deprived of an adequate supply is an unreachable
target. But, it is modest when compared to what
is spent on armaments or even on ice cream
(Worldwatch Institute 2004). Yet, this might imply
that the typical average value of 5 percent of
state expenditures quoted for 1993 by Bhatia and
Falkenmark (1993) might need to be increased by
approximately 10 percent, unless a significant
part of the costs is passed on directly to the
users. The private-public debate and its evolution
and outcomes in different settings mirror the
struggles between competing discourses,
worldviews and interests. Existing patterns of
governance, the emergence of environmentalist-
NGOs and other civil society entities, the
coercive power of international institutions, the
historical background of political struggles, all
influence the final distribution of costs and
benefits and the viability of particular solutions.
Intersectoral Transfers
This section provides a typology of how water is
transferred in practice from agricultural to urban
uses. First, a brief categorization of different
types of transfer is proposed. We then look at the
different types of transfer mechanisms. This
provides a framework for the following section,
which discusses how transfers occur in practice
and some of their consequences.
Transfers Are Happening
Table 1 divides intersectoral water transfers into
temporary and permanent transfers, with
permanent transfers in turn divided into gradual
and outright transfers. Transfers can also be
distinguished according to the share of the source
of origin that is diverted.
Temporary transfers typically occur during a
drought. If the source is large, the impact on
irrigation users may diffuse and be unidentifiable.
If the transfer is a large portion of the source
(often the case during droughts), then temporary
allocation directly impacts on a known group of
farmers who may have to be compensated for
their (temporary) loss. Once the emergency is
over, allocations revert to the original pattern,
always with the possibility that drought will return
sometime in the future. Chennai has bought water
from surrounding wells in times of shortage;
Seville and Manila have reallocated dam water
stocks; and the California Water Bank has
mediated reallocation during the 1991-1993
drought.
Gradual permanent transfers. These occur when a
source of water already tapped by several users
is progressively diverted to the benefit of a city.
In such cases, the transfer typically first amounts
to a limited percentage of the source of origin and
the effects diffuse and are largely unidentifiable
since the source continues to provide a large
share of water to other users.
Outright permanent transfers. These transfers
represent a brutal reallocation of water from one
user to another. If the percentage diverted is
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limited, for example, 5-10 percent of available
supply (as is often the case for large sources),
this can be more easily accommodated (Chiang
Mai, Yazd, Bangkok, Katmandu and Hyderabad).
But if the transfer amounts to a large part or all
of an existing source (e.g., the conversion of
irrigation reservoirs to municipal use in China)
then the transfer is likely to be problematic if no
compensation is paid.
Some transfers are explicit and obvious to
observers, not least to the farmers; others are
more surreptitious. Diversions through canals or
large pumping stations are overt, especially when
they correspond to a large share of the source of
origin. On the other hand, there may be a long
distance between the point of diversion and the
downstream farmers/users, and as such, the
tributary flows and hydrologic variability blur and
mitigate the impact of the diversion. Groundwater
abstraction by a city, or re-appropriation of water
through gradual encroachment upon irrigated land
(e.g., Manila, Lima, Bangkok and Cairo) can pass
virtually unnoticed at first but tend to become
manifest with time, when they impact on other
users (e.g., impact on other groundwater users in
the Lerma basin in Mexico, or Ta’iz in Yemen).
A special case is when transfers concern a
source of water that still has some “excess flow.”
Others in the basin are then in a weaker position
to oppose a transfer, especially if it can be
presented as crucial for economic development or
to ensure equity between regions. The benefits
foregone – not least in environmental uses – are
invariably glossed over even if they are already
apparent (as in the Piracicaba diversion to São
Paulo), or likely to surface in the mid-term (as in
the Mae Klong diversion to Bangkok, or Karum
diversion to Isfahan and beyond), or may surface
in the long run (as in the Melamchi basin to
Katmandu).
The different types of transfers, depending on
how visible they are and on how much water is
diverted, are perceived differently by the
populations impacted. Outright transfers are
clearly more sensitive and generally involve
negotiations and compensation (Tsingtao and
Seville) unless the source is not fully committed
(Bangkok and Katmandu).
Transfer Mechanisms
These considerations suggest a further
categorization based on the mechanisms utilized
in their implementation (table 2). The first type of
transfers occurs through the transfer of formal
rights to the use of water. These are typified by
practices in developed countries, notably the
western USA and other arid regions, but
increasingly also in the eastern USA and other
developed countries (for instance, in the UK,
where traditional riparian rights were modified in
1969 by the introduction of abstraction permits).
Formal rights can, in principle be transferred in a
TABLE 1.
Examples of Water Transfers.
Large percentage of the source of origin Limited percentage of the source of origin
Temporary transfers Deep wells to Chennai; Transfers to Seville, Drought transfers from Krishna river to
Manila. Chennai; The Californian Water Bank
Permanent transfers Zanghe reservoir and Northern Plains Irrigation water to Chiang Mai; Krishna
A. Gradual transfers (China); Jordan river to Amman, and river water to Hyderabad; Transfers from
Chao Phraya river to Bangkok. acequias in New Mexico.
B. Outright transfers Diversions to Mexico City and from Yangtze Transfer from Bhavani river to Tirupur or from
to North China; Diversion of the San Juan river the Zayandeh Rud to Yazd; Diversion of Mae
to supply Monterrey; Buying out of irrigation Klong river to Bangkok; of Kelau river to Kuala
dams by Tsingtao and of wells by Chennai. Lumpur and Melamchi river to Katmandu.
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free market with the price reflecting market
conditions either in real time, or over a longer
period (a season or year), or permanently. Free
markets, however, usually fail to account for
externalities or third party effects (see section
“Are Markets Needed to Relocate Water?”) Given
government concerns and political pressures from
third parties, market sales of formal rights are
normally, therefore, only permitted in a regulated
market, with the terms of the sale set, monitored
and enforced by a public agency. Alternatively,
legislation sets out the terms on which transfers
are to be made, for instance, by establishing
clear priorities at times of drought, or limiting the
term of the right so that it can be transferred to a
higher value use once the term has expired (as in
the UK).
Markets in informal rights, in contrast, develop
spontaneously without regard to third party or
externality effects, sometimes even where, in
principle, transfers are forbidden by law (as, for
instance, in regard to the terms applicable to the
sale of warabundi in north-east India and
Pakistan). Most informal markets are small-scale
and, generally involve farmer-to-farmer sales rather
than intersectoral sales. An exception is the
conversion of irrigation wells to tanker operations
in Amman and some cities in India, which
represents a significant case of an unregulated
market transaction from agricultural to urban use.
TABLE 2.
Transfer Mechanisms from Agriculture to Urban Uses with Examples (see annex).
Without Compensation With Compensation
Formal and Informal Rights
 A. In a free market Not applicable Tanker sales in Chennai, Amman and
numerous other cities; Traditional
Spanish markets
 B. In a regulated market Not applicable The California Water Bank; Markets in the
USA, Australia, Chile etc.
 C. By legal means Limited term rights (UK); Expropriation Expropriation for environmental
for environmental objectives (Australia objectives (USA)
and  USA); Change in law (South-Africa)
Administrative Decision
 A. By formal decision Reallocation during droughts in Purchase of wells or reservoirs (or water
most cities from them), in Chennai, Seville and China.
Industries pumping from irrigation Dam water to Seville; Melamchi to Katmandu.
canals (Isfahan and Chiang Mai) Compensations can also be in terms of
technical interventions (lining)
B. By “stealth” Operation of the Angat reservoir in Manila;
    by means of management Kinjhar lake for Karachi (drought periods);
    of existing resources Northern China reservoirs, etc.
    by means of investment in New diversions to Hyderabad, Bandung, Diversion of Mae Klong to
    diversions from rivers/reservoirs Karachi, Amman, Monterey, Mexico, etc. Bangkok*
    by means of investment Out-pumping of agricultural users
    in wells in Yemen, Mexico, China, etc.
    by means of encroachment on Encroachment of tanks in Land purchases e.g., Cairo,
    irrigated areas or tanks Bangalore Lima, Bangkok, etc.
* Note: compensations were minimal (e.g., subsidies to develop water supply schemes for local villages) and granted later, rather than
part of the initial diversion plan
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Administrative decision has been by far the
most important mechanism for transferring water
from one use to another, both historically in
developed countries and to this day in developing
countries. Formal administrative decisions are
taken by a national, provincial/state or basin
entity depending on the functions assigned to
each under the constitution or in law. Formal
administrative decisions with compensation
typically occur where: a) the farmers giving up
water supplies are readily identifiable and, b) can
bring political pressure to bear on the decision
makers. They involve varying degrees of
consultation between the interested parties
(Seville, Tsingtao, etc.,). Where water is relatively
abundant, either seasonally or more generally,
transfers are more likely to be made without
compensation, being reflected in the priority given
to urban uses at times of drought, and over time
as a basin “closes.”
Direct expropriation is problematic for any
government, even an authoritarian one, especially
in the context of where the local economy
revolves around irrigated agriculture. In a sense it
may be “easier” to displace people for the
construction of a dam than to dispossess them
from the water used for their livelihoods. This is
true even if no formal rights are held. In the few
cases in which formal rights exist and are
effective, expropriation is precluded. The buying
of agricultural wells around some cities such as
Chenai is an example of outright and total
reallocation of minor sources with appropriate
compensation.
Negotiations can include financial
compensations and/or efforts by the city to
reduce its losses or its consumption. El Paso, for
example, obtained water from the Rio Grande on
condition that it reduces its per capita
consumption, recycle sewage water and eliminate
leakage (Earl 1996). Dongyang, Zheijang
Province, obtained water from a dam managed by
Yiwu city but had to increase the height of the
dam and line irrigation canals (Liu 2003). The
much-celebrated 1998 agreement between the
Imperial Valley Irrigation district and the Southern
California Metropolitan Water Authority (MWA)
included the lining of the All-American Canal
(AAC) by MWA with usufruct rights to the 100
Mm3 thought to be conserved passed to Southern
California metropolitan area (CGER 1992), though
in practice this was at the expense of Mexican
farmers.17 Similarly, the Upper Ganga canal was
lined so as to make use of the seepage losses
for supplying Delhi but proved to be at the
expense of well irrigation further downstream.
Molle et al. (2004) use an example from Central
Iran to show that in closed basins, where most or
all resources are committed (often
overcommitted), conservation measures do not
save water but merely reallocate it across the
basin, in a way that is not always perceptible
(see above).
When formal administrative decisions to
transfer water are taken unilaterally, they merge
imperceptibly into informal transfers by stealth
(table 2). This may occur as a result of
investment decisions (as in Hyderabad) or
management decisions (as in Manila), or
development decisions (as in the occupation of
tanks in Bangalore or the conversion of irrigated
land to urban use as in many expanding cities).
Transfers by stealth by definition do not allow for
compensation, although later complaints can
trigger some ex-post measures (Mae Klong to
Bangkok). But do transfers, in the absence of
compensation – whether temporary, gradual or
outright – always in essence amount to
17 “… the so-called “savings” are detrimental to the recharge and quality of the aquifer that is tapped by Mexican farmers on the other
side of the border in the Mexicali Valley” (Cortez-Lara and Garcia-Acevedo 1999). Out of 100 Mm3, 30 Mm3 are captured by the La
Mesa drain (excavated to control the water table) and 70 Mm3 recharge the aquifer. The aquifer is tapped by individual and federal
wells irrigating 19,000 ha, to which must be added 800 ha irrigated from the La Mesa drain. The resulting increase in salinity estimated
at 21.9 ppm/year, could eventually affect an area of 33,400 ha (Cortez-Lara 2004). The decrease in groundwater resources also
renders future supply to expanding urban areas more critical (Castro Ruiz 2004). This situation of untold reallocation is quite common:
the 102 km long canal from Munak to Haiderpur Water Treatment Plant will also be lined and “savings” used to increase supply to
Delhi, to the detriment of farmers (GNCTD 2003). Reallocation from groundwater users to cities is also occurring in China and between
Delicias Irrigation District in Mexico and Texas cities (Pearce 2004).
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expropriation? It can be argued that farmers, who
typically paid only a small fraction (if any) of the
costs of irrigation, cannot object if the state
subsequently withdraws a part of the water
allocated to them. This has less force once the
value of water is capitalized in land prices
since it is usually impracticable to recover
windfall gains accruing to the initial
beneficiaries.
Another argument is that the real costs to
farmers of partial "expropriation" may be less
than what appears at first sight, given the room
for adjustment in many irrigation systems and the
fact that the hidden hand of scarcity elicits
changes in behavior and factor use (Berkoff 2003;
Molle 2002). For example, the reduction of the
dry season irrigation in the Chao Phraya delta
has been paralleled by a significant increase in
cropped areas (Molle 2004b); irrigation deliveries
in Uzbekistan were reduced from about 17,000 to
13,000 m3/ha in the early 90s without significant
effects on crop yield (Davis and Hirji 2003).
Loeve et al. (2003) document cases in China
where crop production has increased despite less
water being made available for irrigation. Of
course, adjustments are possible up to a certain
extent and, as basins close, the room for
maneuvering decreases.
Distinctions between transfer mechanisms are
not always clear-cut. An administrative decision
(e.g., to give priority to urban uses) may be
justified by reference to priorities set out in the
water law that in a sense provide for a
generalized right. Transfers by stealth may
subsequently be confirmed by a formal decision.
Bureaucratic reallocations (with negotiation and
due compensation) are akin to transactions in
informal rights, and even regulated markets. Even
so, categorization both by types of water transfer
(table 1) and by transfer mechanism (table 2)
provides useful reference in discussing transfers
in practice.
Intersectoral Water Transfers in Practice
This section draws a few lessons from the cases
reviewed in the annex. It examines the social,
environmental and political costs attached to
each type of reallocation, and provides hints on
how a particular transfer is justified and selected.
Reallocation Stress: Political and
Social Costs
In a situation of competition, cities will generally
have to re-appropriate water already used,
allocated or “owned” (when a formal right exists)
by other users, generally agriculturalists or nature
itself, and this inevitably generates stress. Such
transfers appear to breed political tension
irrespective of the mechanism used – whether it’s
an unilateral bureaucratic decision, coercion,
compensation or even a market transaction.
Political stress is generated in proportion to the
political clout of the constituencies that stand to
lose in the transfer (the water users in the first
place and subsequently the surrounding
communities). It is obviously more difficult for a
city to acquire water used/controlled by entities
that have political power: agriculturalists may or
may not include powerful landowners and their
political weight in terms of votes also varies (e.g.,
it is strong in India but weak in Malaysia); urban
industrialists, in general, command considerable
power over politicians. Conversely the cost of
doing nothing, or little, is less for politicians when
urban populations affected by prevailing poor
conditions of WS&S are also voiceless. This is
clearly expressed by the Camdessus Report,
which states that “with the mass of people not
serviced, politically weak or disempowered, it is
tempting to postpone spending on maintenance
and periodic replacements, likewise on
investments with a long gestation period.”
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The difficulty of acquiring more water is also
dependent on the political structure and
administrative boundaries. For instance, a transfer
within the same state, region or district –
whatever the local structure – is easier to handle
than those involving different provinces/states in
federal entities. The latter category depends on
the respective powers vested in the central
government and the states, and also on the
clarity of their respective roles. The El Cuchillo
dam conflict between Nuevo Leon and
Tamaulipas, for example, was compounded by
the confusion regarding the legal roles of the
federal, state and local governments (Barajas
1999). Interstate conflicts are pervasive for the
Ganges, Krishna and Cauvery basins in India
(Richards and Singh 2002). Attempts by Chennai
to obtain water from the Krishna river were largely
frustrated and made difficult by the fact that
Tamil Nadu does not even intersect the Krishna
river basin. In contrast, small and centralized
states, such as Tunisia, Jordan or Israel, which
fully control water supply and allocation, can
pursue policies of transfer through national
“carriers” or “water grids.” These countries being
arid may create a need for strong centralized
control over their (countries) resources.
While there may be obvious economic gains
in transferring water from nearby agricultural areas
(if any), decisions cannot be based on simple
economic criteria only. Societies may place
higher value on agriculture because of its
importance for food security to rural livelihoods,
or for cultural reasons (Meinzen-Dick and
Appasamy 2002). Under the ideal conditions of
full employment and perfect mobility, people may
shift from activities which are extremely water-
dependent. In developing countries, however, poor
people are often characterized by lack of mobility,
skills and economic alternatives. In addition to
the social/political stress of depriving an area of
its means of subsistence (even if compensation
is provided), the social costs of displacing people
(migration to slums, increase in urban violence
and other social ills) must also be considered.
One can easily, for example, point to the higher
return of water use in cities such as Sana’a,
Chennai or Mexico City (as well as the greater
willingness of this population to pay for their use
of water), but it may not be feasible to transfer
water out of irrigation to higher value use when
the bulk of the population in the area of origin
lives on agriculture.
The different options (including inaction) have
costs and benefits that are distributed unevenly
across society and generate specific costs and
risk. In sum, decision-making incorporates wider
aspects of the local political economy such as
social, transaction, political, and sometimes even
environmental costs attached to the various
demand- or supply-oriented options; the nature of
the possible source of funding; the degree of
mobilization/pressure by various constituencies;
pre-existing customary (or other) rights and water
uses (Howe et al. 1990; Howe 1987). Eventually,
decision makers tend to follow the “path of least
resistance” (Kenney 2004). Although the mere
financial costs of water resources development
projects are typically rising18 and are, sometimes
prohibitive, supply-augmentation options are often
chosen. This shows that the consideration of all
the costs and benefits (private or collective)
weighed by the relative clout of the
constituencies (benefited/affected) leads to
decisions which may differ from what a more
narrow sectoral rationality might, prima facie,
suggest to be the way forward.
The path of least resistance may change
over time, depending on the shifting political clout
of the parties involved, and may even prompt the
reversal of decisions that were acceptable at an
earlier point in time: the amount of water
abstracted by Mexico City in the Lerma basin had
to be decreased due to protests; the opposition of
the Temascaltepec farmers to the export of water
to the capital has also stalled this new project
18Bhatia and Falkenmark (1993) and Serageldin (1995) estimate that the financial and environmental costs of tapping new supplies
will be, on average, two or three times those of existing investments, because most of the low-cost, accessible water reserves have
already been exploited.
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(Tortajada and Castelan 2003). Another striking
example is that of Los Angeles, which has been
forced by lawsuits to restore flows and wildlife
habitat in the lower Owens valley and to limit
exports from the Mono basin: the amount of
water diverted to Los Angeles from these two
sources dropped from 620 Mm3 in 1980 to 370
Mm3 in the 1990s (Fitzhugh and Richter 2004),
resulting, however, in growing diversions from the
Colorado river and the Central Valley.
The case studies show that the most traveled
paths of least resistance are: 1) stealth
reallocations (when they are quantitatively limited
with regard to the source or obscured by the
nature of the hydrologic cycle); 2) diversion of
surface water away from downstream
ecosystems; 3) the use/overuse of groundwater
(to the detriment of sustainability); and, 4) the
development of (costly) resources (partly because
they provide financial/political benefits to decision
makers). These options are normally selected
when/because they are expected to arouse less
opposition in the short term, but the assessment
of political risk is often uncertain. Although the
undefined or open-access nature of groundwater
has provided cities with opportunities to tap the
resource with ambiguity, it has sometimes
generated a backlash as in the case of Jaipur,
where farmers clashed with the police after wells
were dug in areas adjacent to their lands to
supply water to the city (Londhe et al. 2004).
Similar examples are provided by Ta’iz, where
most agricultural wells ran dry and led to civil
unrest, and by Athens, where its use of a well-
field in the Yliki lake area allegedly lowered the
water table, provoking complaints from nearby
small-scale farmers (Kallis 2004).
Water crises are, also, useful events that
assist in reducing political costs by increasing the
acceptability of certain decisions: droughts are
useful events that can serve to obscure human
responsibility for water shortage, e.g., due to
faulty planning, mismanagement of reservoirs or
wasteful distribution and use. They are used to
justify technical or political options in line with the
agendas of a surprising range of vested interests,
from conventional supply-augmentation
supporters,19 to those attached to an ethic of
efficiency and management, via neo-liberals
advocating privatization and commercialization
(Kaika 2003) to, perhaps surprisingly,
environmentalists advocating neo-Malthusian
concepts of “limits to growth” and sustainability
(Bakker 2003). Images of cracked soils and
withered crops are used to manufacture consent
or passivity around varied plans and strategies as
documented in contexts as diverse as Seville
(building the Melonares dam, despite
environmental impacts) —- (del Moral and
Giansante 2000), Athens (Kaika 2003), north-east
Brazil (Coelho 1985), Gujarat (Mehta 2001), or
California (Nevarez 1996). This explicitly shows
that while crises may be used to pass desirable
reforms there is no assurance that they will not
be used to support business-as-usual decisions,
or vested narrow interests.
The creation of wider and more democratic
debates often challenges existing interests and
raises the political costs of certain options.
Pursuing a mere economic logic is likely to be
detrimental to equity, but unchecked centralized
and obscure decision making may favor costly
options that only benefit a few constituencies.
Political mediation has to follow a narrow path
between public and private interests.
Minimizing Impacts: Forgetting
Hydrology
Unsurprisingly, cities do not publicize widely their
water projects, minimize their impacts, and avoid
talk of compensation if they can find a way to
justify increased or new abstractions. The fact
that in many cases only a limited percentage of
the source is diverted is used to stress the
19In São Paulo, Brazil, the current water crisis has allegedly been presented as more severe than it was in reality as a way to justify
and press for transfers from the Ribeira river (Assunção 2004).
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benign nature of transfers, and the ambiguity
between temporary and permanent transfers
provides the context for justifying permanent
decisions. At times of stress, when the marginal
value of water is high, the priority right of the city
is made manifest and other uses are curtailed
first. Between 1980 and 1996, water supplies to
agriculture in the Guadalquiver basin were normal
in only 4 years, and fluctuating between 65
percent of requirements to no supply at all
(Fereres and Cena 1997) in other years, with a
total prohibition of irrigation in 1995 (Martin et al.
1997). In 2001, in the Zayandeh Rud basin,
irrigation supply to 120,000 ha was reduced to
zero. In Portugal, in the Alentejo region, supply to
irrigation was curtailed during the 1993-1995
drought, while municipal and industrial (M&I) use
was sustained (Caldas et al. 1997). Amman’s
supply was hardly impacted by the 2000/2001
drought, while supply to agriculture was severely
restricted. All the water from the Angat dam used
by farmers can be reserved for Manila in times of
drought (McIntosh 2003). In 1991, the California
State Water Project cut off supplies to farmers
and the Bureau of Reclamation reduced its
supplies to the Central Valley Project by 75
percent (Anderson and Snyder 1997).
Less extreme examples come from Thailand,
where supply to the Chao Phraya delta in the dry
seasons of 1992, 1993 and 1994 was around 50
percent of normal levels, with Bangkok given
priority (Molle et al. 2001); and by Coimbatore,
where the Pillur diversion making up 3 percent of
the average at the Bhavani Sagar dam is planned
to be doubled (Lundqvist 1993), implying that in
deficit years water to downstream farmers will be
reduced by up to one-fourth. When Indonesia was
hit with a major drought in 1994, residents’ wells
ran dry, but supply to Jakarta’s golf courses was
ensured so as not to impact on tourism. In 1998,
in the midst of a 3-year drought, the Government
of Cyprus cut the water supply to farmers by 50
percent while guaranteeing the country’s annual
2-million tourists the water they needed (Barlow
and Clarke 2003). Such situations contrast with the
western USA, where cities often hold rights that
are junior to those held by irrigators (Colby 1993).
These examples not only confirm that
nonagricultural uses almost always get priority
but also show that the crux of the matter is not
so much the average amount diverted to cities
but what this share becomes at times of
shortage. Unsurprisingly, gradual or small
outright transfers are justified based on their
alleged limited average impact. When a drought
occurs and the impact felt becomes critical, it is
always possible to naturalize crises, blaming it
on climatic change, El Niño, or bad luck.
Referring to a dispute over the Bhavani Sagar
dam, Tamil Nadu officials stated:“ Of course, the
land is already (command area} entitled for
water, but subject to availability” and lamented
that “the rain gods had not been very kind to
Tamil Nadu” (The Hindu 2003). More generally,
the impact of transfers on existing uses is
understandably kept vague. The water, soon to
be diverted from the Veeranam tank to Chennai,
was officially declared by the government to be
“only excess water”  (The Hindu 2004b) but other
observers air their concern about availability of
excess water, because in the last 10 years there
has not been enough water to feed the
Veeranam ayacut (The Financial Express 08/11/
2003). The diversion is supposed to be only
during 6 months, but it is not difficult to foresee
what will transpire in the dry season if Chennai
city runs out of water. Treatment and
conveyance infrastructure worth Rs 7,000 million
(US$45 million) provides a compelling argument
to use water from the tank for the city supply.
Likewise, the successive steps of water
diversion from the Kinjhar lake to Karachi are
presented as not impacting on other water users,
despite contrary evidence surfaces at times of
shortage.
The denial of hydrologic realities allows the
consequences of a transfer to be glossed over.
The agreement between the states of Nuevo Leon
and Tamaulipas, for example, stipulates that
water from El Cuchillo dam is for human
consumption of Monterrey, on the condition, at
the same time, that the needs of irrigation are
“preserved.” This wishful thinking surprisingly did
not address hydrologic issues in more detail and
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it is safe to assume that this omission was
purposive.20 Earlier studies had shown that the
water that El Cuchillo would store was indeed
already appropriated downstream and, as such, a
more detailed discussion would have made
agreement impossible. Even with a rough sharing
in quantitative terms (a second agreement in
1990 specified that Monterrey would divert 5 m3/s
– and 10 m3/s in a second phase – while
restituting 3 m3/s of treated return water), the
hydrological variability was not considered and it
was clear that the first drought (1996–1997) would
reveal the underlying conflict i.e., upstream
domestic use would likely take precedence over
downstream irrigation (Barajas 1999).
Environmental Impacts of Transfers
While cities gradually displace agriculture, the
practice (agriculture) has to adjust and respond to
the squeeze. Part of the response comes through
an increase in efficiency, notably at the basin
level where a greater part of return flows is
reused and depleted. In other cases, agriculture
comes to use wastewater instead of freshwater.
In many cases, however, irrigation compensates
this reallocation by taking more water from the
environment. The tendency to over-develop
irrigation schemes, as manifest in basins where
the level of diversion has long caused critical
environmental damage on downstream areas (this
is epitomized by the example of the Aral sea) is,
therefore, compounded by this induced additional
pressure. In cases where little agricultural water
can be re-appropriated by cities (irrespective of
whether this is because of physical unavailability
or socio-political reasons), cities will tend to
directly “displace nature.” Only in basins where a
lot of water is untapped (or in periods when river
flows are abundant) will abstraction by cities have
little impact on other water users. In places where
conflicts already occur and where environmental
degradation is already sizeable, these will further
compound the impact on the environment.
The notion of displacement is very much
dependent on the viewpoint adopted regarding
what should natural flow be and whether “excess
water” is an acceptable concept or not. Flood
regimes have various important functions such as
spreading fertile silt, recharging groundwater,
flushing pollution, sustaining ecosystems attuned
to them (Hunt 2004). Agriculture in the Ganges
delta, as well as the Sunderbans, the world’s
largest coastal forest, for example, depends on
the flood of the Ganges and Brahmaputra
(Khalequzzaman 2003). Likewise, fisheries in the
Mekong basin, notably in the Tonle Sap, are
strongly correlated to the yearly flood. If we
consider these functions as essential, it is clear
there is no excess water in a basin. At the other
extreme, the age-old engineering view that no
water should reach the sea if resources were
properly managed has proved devastating. The
characterization of this degradation and the issue
of reconciling production and conservation are
major debates, which lie out of the scope of this
report. Suffice it to say here that in most basins
where significant conflicts occur, and where,
therefore, the issues of intersectoral transfers
examined here prevail, aquatic ecosystems have
already been significantly impacted and that
displacement is synonymous with further
degradation.21
While both agricultural and urban uses tend to
displace nature, the transfer of water to cities, in
general, results in more wastewater being
generated, and in turn, having an increased
emission of pollutants and contaminants. Cities
dispose of 80 percent of the water they divert as
20President Salinas’ speech for the inauguration of El Cuchillo dam on October 17, 1994 was typical of the way politicians like to frame
projects in terms of administrative boundaries rather than hydrological ones, overlooking interactions that will, however, soon surface:
Salinas declared that “El Cuchillo dam is a project of Nuevo Leon and for Nuevo Leon, which will solve future water supply” (Barajas
1999).
21Cities or industries have long extensively polluted the environment and impacted on ecosystems, fisheries, and biodiversity. Fitzhugh
and Richter (2004), for example, describe the historical development of water resources of five major American cities and how this has
destroyed, compromised or threatened a wide range of ecosystem services, as well as reduced biodiversity.
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wastewater. Only 10 percent of the effluents from
cities in developing countries are treated (UNEP
2003; Sadeq 1999; Joyce 1997). Just as drainage
has often been the “poor relation” of irrigation in
part because it jeopardizes formal cost-
effectiveness, disposal or treatment of effluents
from the M&I sector has often been a nonstarter.
In both cases, development was achieved at the
cost of the environment and – for the lack of
treatment – of the health of populations. The
growth of urban/industrial water needs, therefore,
impacts not only in terms of transfer of equivalent
volumes of water but also in terms of reduction of
the stock of usable water by rendering part of it
unfit for human or agricultural use.22
A good example of this is provided by
Janakarajan (2003) and Tewari and Pillai (2003)
who describe the impact of tanneries on the Palar
river basin, in Tamil Nadu.23 Tanneries use many
toxic chemicals and generate heavy pollution that
is passed on to agriculture via surface water and
to domestic users via groundwater (Amarnath and
Krishnamoorthy 2001). The industries have
exhausted all resources and polluted the basin to
the point that downstream farmers have refused
to use the river. Water in the Damodar river,
India, is polluted by coal mines and other
industries to a degree that it is unfit even for
agriculture (Hardoy et al. 2001). Likewise, in
South Africa, effluents from mines have polluted
rivers to an extent that the water cannot be used
for domestic purposes any longer. When the
situation becomes untenable, as in the case of
the Huai river basin in China in the 1990s, drastic
action may be taken to close down paper
industries, tanneries and other polluting sources,
and prohibiting farmers to use the contaminated
water (Postel 1999).
It must be noted, however, that agriculture
activities are now increasingly contributing their
own pollution load in turning surface water and
groundwater almost unusable for the cities. Seville,
for example, cannot use water from the
Guadalquivir that flows by because of pesticide
and fertilizer residues (Del Moral and Giansante
2000). The cost of agricultural pollution in the USA
is estimated at US$9 billion per year (Bate 2002).
In many instances, all types of pollution combine
to make it unfit for domestic supply. The King
Talal dam near Amman was initially constructed to
supply the city but it now collects treated
wastewater, water that is destined for irrigation;
although as many as 13 rivers flow through
Jakarta, the degradation of water quality prevents
the city from using any of them, and forces it to
tap surface sources 78 km away as well as
groundwater (McIntosh 2003); a similar situation is
found in Chinese cities such as Yingkuo (Bhatia
and Falkenmark 1993), Chengdu, where water
pollution and silt have forced the closure of two
river intakes and thereby compelling the
government to invest heavily in the rehabilitation of
the watersheds (McIntosh 2003).
As noted earlier, one common way to meet
growing needs, or to respond to displacement by
cities in the case of agriculture, has been to
exploit/overexploit groundwater resources. Tapping
groundwater is the easiest solution because it
generally relies on individual or corporate
investments (as opposed to public ones), it is
spatially spread with little need for infrastructure,
and it penalizes constituencies that often have
22The degree of degradation of water quality has long reached alarming levels (Lundqvist 1998; Butler and Maksimovic 2001;
Niemczynowicz 1996; Postel 1999; Barlow and Clarke 2003). Although this situation was already manifest in the post-World War II
period in developed countries (Lunqvist et al. 2001) and in the 1970s in developing countries (e.g., Lee 1979) societal responses
have been dismal. It is now becoming apparent that our knowledge of the effects of concentrated toxic wastes on human and
environmental health is poor and that the number of new chemical substances that are released into the environment far exceeds
those that are monitored or researched (Peters and Meybeck 2000).
23In the Palar basin these industries contribute to about Indian Rs 50 billion (US$1,052 million) by way of foreign exchange annually,
besides employing 100,000 people directly and indirectly (Janakarajan 2003). A similar story unfolded in Tirupur, where the hosiery
industry generated Rs 30 billion in 1999, with more than half of the population depending on this industry for their living (Narain 1999;
Lundqvist et al. 2003).
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little voice (nature and the environment) and the
next generations (because of depleted or
contaminated resources).24 That between 1.5
and 2 billion humans in the world, of which
one billion urban dwellers in Asia (Foster
1999), almost 99 percent of the USA’s rural
population and 80 percent of India’s population
(Sampat 2000), are reported to rely on
groundwater for domestic consumption gives
an idea of how widely this solution has been
resorted to. It is “cheaper” for decision makers
to disregard these externalities rather than
adopt sustainable solutions, on both financial
(the marginal cost of alternative surface supply
is increasing) and political grounds
(expropriating or even acquiring rights from
other users is a painful and troublesome
process). While groundwater has offered an
easy way out of many urban stalemates, the
hidden costs will be increasingly apparent in
the next decades, as some of these resources
are exhausted or contaminated. Externalities
include:
• Reduction in available stocks, drop in the
water level and resulting increase in
pumping depth and related expenditures.
Other users are pumped out. The cone of
depression created in Shijiashuang city in
China, has rendered groundwater use
unsustainable and resulting an increase in
the pumping costs to farmers (Kendy et
al. 2003).
• Land subsidence in cities like Mexico
City (10 m during the last century),
Manila, Jakarta, Cangzhou (Page 2001)
and Beijing. Subsidence in some parts of
Bangkok has reached 20 cm a year and
one-third of the city is now under sea
level. Subsidence affects not only
buildings and roads (Nair 1991) but also
the future water storing capacity of the
aquifer itself.
• The quality of groundwater almost
everywhere. Realization of its extent is
increasing in proportion to the number of
measures and investigations being carried
out. In the USA, a wide range of
pollutants have been found to infiltrate
into the soil and reach the aquifer:
nitrates and pesticides from agriculture
and golf courses, petrochemicals from
underground storage tanks (gas stations),
effluents from metals and plastics
degreasing, nuclear, medical and other
hazardous waste from landfills, etc.,
(Sampat 2000). The most significant
consequences are health hazards and the
reduction in supply available because of
degradation of the quality of water
resources.
• Salinity intrusion due to the overdraft of
coastal aquifers in cities such as Tel
Aviv (Swyngedouw et al. 2002), Lima
(Masson 2002), Jakarta (Gany 2003),
Manila (Fellizar 1994) and Dakar. Salinity
intrusion has rendered aquifers
increasingly unfit for both domestic and
agricultural use.
• The drying up of springs and wetlands
fed by groundwater flows that are
affected by the lowering of water tables.
In Jordan, the overdraft of the aquifer to
supply Amman and irrigated crops has
dried up the Azraq wetland, a Ramsar
site used by migratory birds. Of the
world’s wetlands 50 percent are said to
have disappeared (UNESCO 2004) and
these depletions have been mainly due to
overexpansion of irrigation.
24This statement might, however, be cancelled by the probable development of cheaper desalination processes in the near future that
could replace the dwindling supply from exhausted aquifers.
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Contamination of freshwater decreases the
water available precisely at a time when demand
is rising. Figure 2 provides a (conceptual) chart
that shows the effects of seasonal water scarcity,
due to increases in demand and increases in
contaminated water that is unfit for consumption.
Average available resources are shown
declining (due to abstractions upstream). Quality-
induced scarcity, as shown in the chart, does not
affect a fixed portion of resources but, rather,
increases both with time (growing emission of
pollutants) and with physical scarcity (since more
water appears as contaminated when dilution is
less): the Karum river in Iran, for example, saw
its discharge during the drought in the year 2000
being reduced to 20 percent of the normal value
and as a result, water became unfit for human
consumption. Water was brought by tankers and
cargo trains from other regions to supply cities in
the lower basin, including Ahwaz, which has a
population of about a million, provoking social
unrest (Motiee et al. 2001). Moreover, as
groundwater use is regulated or declines because
of pumping costs or quality problems, pressure is
shifted back onto surface water. This is already
apparent in Bangkok, where industries have been
told to use piped water instead of wells and a
similar situation prevails in Jakarta too (Gany 2003).
Societal responses to urban environmental
degradation are akin to those regarding poor
supply, and the degree of popular mobilization
defines the cost of doing nothing (Lundqvist et al.
2001). The experience in developed countries
during the nineteenth century has been referred to
above. Similar pressures have occurred in
developing countries. The inhabitants of Vidisha,
on a tributary of the Yamuna river, forced the
government to act in reaction to degradation of
their river—stench and dead fish (Narain 1999),
and community action supported by the media
also prompted state action in São Paulo in the
late 1980s (Hermann and Braga 1997). A similar
story unfolded in the Lerma-Chapala basin,
Mexico, in the late 1980s. Lake Chapala, the
main source of water for the city of Guadalajara,
was seriously threatened by growing biological
and chemical water pollution. This generated a
public outcry in the state of Jalisco and the
administration was eventually pushed to take
action and a large-scale sewage treatment
FIGURE 2.
Physical and quality-induced water deficits.
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program25 was launched in 1991 (Mestre-
Rodríguez 1997). Generalizing Narain’s (1999)
observations on India, “what will really happen will
clearly depend on the stamina of the people living
downstream.” Such initiatives are often neither
recognized nor supported by government, and
may even be undermined or opposed by other
interest groups or bureaucratic and/or political
interests (Lundqvist et al. 2001).
The overall picture is that if cities have
generally found ways to increase their water
supply, this has often been in an unsustainable
and damaging way, displacing agriculture and
nature. Water allocation and use in the different
sectors are going to be critically impacted by
issues of water quality. Spatial interactions
through the hydrological cycle are not defined
only by questions of quantity but also
increasingly by quality. While environmental
qualities are enhanced in some places and for
some people, this is often achieved at the cost
of deterioration in other places with severe
impacts on other groups of people (Swyngedouw
et al. 2002). In understanding water problems one
must consider how human activities influence
quantity and quality of the resource base, and
how benefits and costs are generated or shifted
both spatially and across social groups.
Are Urban Uses Constrained by Agriculture?
Discussions of urban scarcity generally focus on
domestic WS&S services, with little reference to
stress undergone by industries. Combining
industrial and municipal (M&I) uses because they
are often spatially concentrated can be confusing.
They are distinct from both a physical and a
political-economic point of view. First, industries,
in general, need secure a continuous supply of
high-quality water. They thus tend to exploit deep
aquifers where it is feasible. In Bangkok, for
example, 90 percent of industries resort to
groundwater (TDRI 1990) mostly because the
quality of water from the river is too poor
(Srivardhana 1994). In Monterrey, when the
supply of pipe water became uncertain, industries
shifted to groundwater. Second, the industrial
sector represents an interest group that is
affluent, powerful and closely linked to the
highest levels of political and bureaucratic
apparatuses.
In contrast to industry, domestic users can
adjust behavior in case of shortage, and daily
allocations may fall below 100 l/capita without
causing any major impact other than the
reduction of supplies for car washing, gardens,
swimming pools, etc. Health impacts may
intensify due to lack of treatment capacity in time
of shortage (e.g., the 1999–2001 crisis in Isfahan;
the 1990s crisis in Chennai) or when supply and
sanitation are altogether poor. The deterioration of
water quality results in the spread of waterborne
diseases (with 2.2 million deaths attributable
annually to diarrhea and the lack of safe drinking
water, sanitation and hygiene.)26 Outbreaks of
cholera and gastroenteritis were recorded in
Chennai in the 1990s (Brisset 2003), and in
25This also serves to confirm that the alleged lack of funds is relative to political pressure: “The projects were mostly generated by
State and Municipal authorities and funding was raised by federal water rights (a payment similar to tax), subsidies (both federal and
state originated), domestic and foreign credits, private sector investments and water supply savings derived from water pricing strategies.”
(Mestre-Rodríguez 1997).
26Altogether, 1.1 billion people lack access to improved water supply and 2.4 billion to improved sanitation (UNESCO 2003). The World
Bank (2002) estimates that half of the population in the poorest cities lack access to WS&S. Domestic and industrial pollution have
severely impacted Jakarta’s water quality and the health of its residents, with diarrhea responsible for 20 percent of deaths of children
under 5 years of age (WRI 1996).
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South-Africa, epidemics have been linked to the
cutting-off of supply to people who could not pay
(Marsden 2002; AfroNews 2004).
Many big cities with poor WS&S are fast-
growing (La Paz, Hyderabad, Amman and Ta’iz).
Simon (1998) notes that: “Ironically, the areas of
the world with the fastest growing populations are
also the areas with already severe water
problems, and the shortage will get much worse.”
This serves to show that lack of water does not
hinder expansion although growth outpaces
financial capacity to expand supply networks.
Such situations often prevail when rural-urban
transfers are characterized as a push process,
whereby impoverished rural families migrate to
cities out of despair, regardless of the conditions
they are likely to face in the cities. This contrasts
starkly with the situation in western countries
where water is a prerequisite to expansion: many
cities in the western USA, for example, require
developers to prove their right to adequate
provision of water before construction begins
(Emel 1990), and others, like in Arizona, have
required urban water suppliers to acquire rights as
a prerequisite for annexation of new suburban
developments to urban water systems (Lund and
Israel 1993).
Industrial and other economic activities
typically enjoy a secure and predictable supply.
The extent to which they are significantly
disrupted by sporadic or general water shortage is
debatable. Episodic shortages hardly or rarely
impact on commercial and industrial activities
since they are given priority over other water
users. It is only in rare cases that industries are
forced to suspend their activities. Recent
shortages in the industrial and tourist zone of the
Eastern Seaboard, near Bangkok, have been met
by a government commitment to implement six
interbasin transfers and drill 290 artesian wells for
short-term relief. This, however, spurred protests
from farmers using groundwater (Samabuddhi
2005).27 Page (2001) cites a survey of Hebei
province by Xinhua agency, which showed “how
local officials enforced restrictions on farmers but
overlooked those on industry to lure projects from
which they could profit.” Chan and Shimou (1999)
refer to industries in coastal China that are
occasionally affected by water shortages, with
suggestions that water-intensive industries should
be moved inland. In this case, water scarcity is
at the basin level and its cumulative impact on
downstream areas is what affects industry. In
severe droughts, industries using surface water
may also be impacted but in such cases supply
to agriculture has usually long been discontinued
(e.g., Manila in 1997-1998 and other examples
given earlier) and domestic use is drastically
rationed (e.g., Chennai in 2001, Ramakrishnan
2002a). Even in such cases, it is dubious
whether the costs of implementing measures that
would decrease the probability of such
occurrences would be lower than the losses
incurred.
Another question is whether (long-term)
investment in services or industry is significantly
constrained by water availability. This is a matter
of debate with little information available. By and
large, industries that offer to create jobs and
increase business taxes are unlikely to be denied
preferential access to municipal water.
Alternatively, they abstract groundwater
regardless of whether this is sustainable or not.28
Ramakrishnan (2002a), for example, describes
the drastic restrictions on water supply in Chennai
but, at the same time, reports that the Chennai
Petroleum Corporation’s demand for an additional
15,000 m3/day needed for its expansion project
(in addition to the existing supply of 18,000 m3)
has been agreed upon. Except for the fact, that
27The Finance Minister is reported to have told senior bureaucrats that their “heads are pledged as a guarantee, since this issue is a
problem for the entire country…I don’t want to hear again that industries along the Eastern Seaboard are facing water problems,
whether it’s this year or in any other year.’’
28In Isfahan, for example, while water in the Zayandeh Rud basin is over-allocated, new industries are allocated the water they need:
these amounts to an implicit transfer of water out of agriculture (the residual user). Industries (including steel factories) pay a much
higher charge per unit of water than agriculture.
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highly water-consuming industries such as
making aluminum are unlikely to settle in water-
short areas (which is, probably, a positive
outcome), evidence of significant water-based
constraints on investments has still to be
documented.
Even so it is widely believed that increased
supply to cities could enhance economic output,
with scarcity attributed to excessive allocation to
agriculture; that physical scarcity is due not to
natural conditions but due to available water
being locked up in agriculture (see section titled
“Urban Water Scarcity”). In the ADB’s (2000)
view, for example, “Major obstacles to the
rational reallocation of water among users … are
the legal and regulatory constraints on water
transfers and, in many countries, the complex
systems of water rights that inhibit the free
movement of water as an economic good.”
Further, Arriens (2004) states that: “the
allocation of water to high-value uses is a matter
of economic accountability.” In contrast, others
observe that farmers are “losing out” (Winpenny
1994), urban interests are getting the “upper
hand” (Lundqvist 1993), and that “without a
doubt, cities will continue to siphon water away
from agriculture” (Postel 1999). This suggests
that cities eventually succeed in getting the
water they need, if necessary from agriculture,
and that intersectoral reallocation of water is
taking place.29 If so, why does the literature
place such emphasis on the gains from
reallocation? One possibility is that the debate is
influenced by western USA experience where
prior appropriation and concern for third-party
impacts has indeed hindered smooth reallocation
of the (senior) rights held by irrigators to cities
(see annex). This may have been further inflated
because some economists advocate markets
out of ideological inclination rather than practical
experience (Bauer 2004). It is intriguing to see
the ubiquity of this argument, even in countries
where sectoral reallocation seems to have been
handled relatively successfully.
If agricultural water use is not a determining
factor of the status of urban water supply, then
the “lion’s share” argument is potentially
misleading. The ubiquitous statement that
“reducing the water consumed by irrigation by 10
percent could double the amount of water
available for domestic supply worldwide” (IRN
2003; WWC [2000] in footnote 2) suggests
deceptively that problems of poor WS&S
conditions would be solved, and that economic
growth would be much enhanced if, only, irrigation
were to release a limited portion of “its” water. It
fails both to appreciate that reallocation in
practice does occur, and to understand the
economic and political aspects of urban water
supply and scarcity.
29Recently, Rijsberman (2004) also observed that domestic water supply out-competes other uses, “both because the amounts involved
are small and because water for domestic purposes is of such high value and clear priority that it takes precedence over other uses.”
Where Are We Heading?
Demand and Supply Management
The literature on demand management or “soft
path approaches” (Gleick 2003) to water
management often suggests that “doing better
with the water we have” will be enough to ease
the pressure over water resources e.g.,
improvements in irrigation efficiency, control of
leakage in urban networks, awareness-raising
programs, recycling and reuse, pricing of water,
etc., are expected to put demand in line with
supply. It is beyond doubt that all these
measures can have positive outcomes and must
be considered as a priority, before going for more
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costly supply augmentation schemes.30
Successful experience is mainly reported from
the industrial and domestic sectors. In the short
run, it has been shown possible to reduce urban
consumption (typically by around 20 percent, see
Bhatia and Falkenmark 1993) through price
incentives and retrofitting houses; some cities
have succeeded in stabilizing their consumption
for some time (Fitzhugh and Richter 2004).
However, when tariffs were raised in many Asian
cities such as Chennai, Colombo and Manila, no
drop in demand was recorded, indicating that
demand is price inelastic at these levels of use
and prices (McIntosh 2003). Ten years ago, the
average level of unaccounted-for-water in World
Bank supported projects was reported as 36
percent (Bhatia and Falkenmark 1993); rates of
standard losses of 10 percent in efficient cities
show that significant conservation can often be
achieved, thus obviating the development of new
and costly resources, at least for some time
(Engen 1999).
Agriculture, although the major water user,
has been surprisingly less amenable to demand
management. It is now recognized (see section
titled “Some Limitations of the Conventional
Framework”) that local water savings in
agriculture often fail to reduce the fraction of
water that is depleted and that, in closed basins,
they amount to reallocation of water among users
through the hydrological cycle (Molle et al. 2004).
“Doing better with what we have” also includes
raising crop water productivity: ubiquitous calls for
changes in cropping patterns overlook that crops
with a higher return are not necessarily those with
a lower water consumption (e.g., rice in Egypt or
Iran) and that diversification is constrained by soil
and drainage properties, financial risk, farmers’
lack of capital or skills and markets. The
potential of water pricing in irrigated agriculture,
too, has been grossly inflated and there is now
growing recognition that a host of factors limit its
impact on behavior. Charging for cost-recovery
and to generate funds to maintain the system is
no doubt essential, but its potential as a means
for eliciting reallocation from agriculture to other
sectors is now widely considered as negligible
(Savenije and van der Zaag 2002; Cornish et al.
2004; Cornish and Perry 2003; Hellegers and
Perry 2004; Molle 2002). The World Bank also
recently recognized that the idea of managing the
allocation of water resources across sectors
through pricing has been illusory (World Bank
2003c; Briscoe 2004). In addition, what this report
shows is that the potential economic gains of
reallocation – irrespective of the mechanism used
to transfer water between sectors – is lower than
commonly believed.
These are indications that, however
necessary and desirable it may be, demand
management under many circumstances is
unlikely to yield sufficient gains (Molle and
Turral 2004). Saving 20 percent of treated water
by reducing leakage in an urban network is
desirable, but it will not drastically alter the
situation in cities that are growing at 5 percent a
year or more (before the 1997 economic crisis
water use in Bangkok was growing at 10%, as in
many Chinese cities nowadays; see Molle
2004b). While pricing can have an impact on
demand in cities, such as Beijing, where use is
relatively high, demand management may still
have limited impact on the imbalance between
availability and potential use in rapidly expanding
cities, at least until they start to stabilize as in
many developed countries. This should not
encourage an excessive focus on supply
management, but also recognize that all
measures must be considered simultaneously.
Even California’s water problems (or Colorado’s),
for example, are addressed through a wide range
of measures (Svendsen 2001). Therefore, it is
likely that providing water to sprawling cities will
require the whole gamut of measures – supply
augmentation, conservation, recycling, (re)
allocation – at our disposal.
30For example, New York’s experience suggests that the costs of the watershed protection program are only 38 percent of the cost of
a filtration system (Sampat 2000; Postel et al. 2005). Generally, repairing pipe networks in cities is cheaper in terms of m3 of water
supplied available. However, this is not always the case, as some networks are decayed, with no map available, and very dense
settlements make work extremely difficult.
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Whenever possible, it is probable that
interbasin transfers will have to be implemented.
As Berkoff (2003) has shown for the North China
Plain, it is not only growing cities that beg for
additional supply, but also an environment that
has been critically damaged, and a stressed
irrigation sector. Additional water will help manage
and smooth the transition from an agricultural to a
nonagricultural-based economy, avoiding or
lessening disruptions associated with push-type
migrations to cities. This supply augmentation
option goes against the idea that demand-
management can deal with actual imbalances and
that capital-intensive solutions are outmoded. On
the other hand, the logic underlying the
attractiveness of capital-intensive solutions to
elites and decision makers is probably still at
work and has not been significantly checked. The
resurgence of large-scale diversion plans in
Brazil, the Middle East, India, Thailand and
China, to give a few examples, might be an
indicator of this trend.31
Are Markets Needed To Reallocate
Water?
Analysts who emphasize the need to reallocate
water out of agriculture to nonagricultural uses
also tend to be proponents of market-oriented
solutions (Anderson and Snyder 1997; Thobani
1997; Rosegrant and Binswanger 1994). They
make the case that markets offer a mechanism
that both determines the “right” price of
transactions and offers compensation to the
seller. Small-scale water markets have long
existed in many arid countries: the ancient
markets and auctioning of water in Alicante,
Spain are well known (Maass and Anderson 1978)
but, more generally, most of the countless
community-based irrigation systems are supplied
by springs or qanats (Beaumont et al. 1889;
Molle et al. 2004) in the Middle East. And in the
North-Africa region it is well-defined individual
rights that lend themselves to temporary or
permanent transactions. The great majority of the
transactions occur in “spot markets”: neighbors in
a system occasionally swap, lend, borrow, sell or
buy water turns in order to fine-tune supply to
time-specific individual demands. This also
occurs in large-scale irrigation systems when
supply is sufficiently predictable and defined in a
way (time and discharge) that allows some
degree of quantitative estimation (e.g., warabandi
in Pakistan and India). More recently, groundwater
markets have also developed in South Asia, but
they are more akin to the buying of a service
than of water itself. At these scales, transaction
costs are minimized because users know each
other (Reidinger 1994) and can readily
communicate, transfers are across short
distances and, as such, preclude costly
infrastructures or significant losses. Permanent
transfer of ownership is also socially controlled
and local third-party impacts are more easily
identified and taken into account. It is worth
noting that such markets have existed for
centuries and occur quite naturally, as users soon
understand that scarce resources can be more
efficiently allocated and used when flexibility is
allowed.
The extension of market mechanisms on a
larger scale has been much less frequent and
more difficult (Livingston 1995). Markets in the
western USA (see annex) are limited by
constraints that reflect the crucial nature of water
for life and the complexity of the hydrological
cycle, which invariably generates third-party
impacts (Dellapenna 2000; Kenney 2003; Libecap
2003). The Colorado-Big-Thompson system where
market transactions have allowed smooth and
gradual transfer, partly because trading is
occurring only within the system and because the
water district holds the right to all return-flows
(Howe and Goemans 2003; Libecap 2003). Water
markets in Australia remain limited in terms of
volume traded, but reallocation has performed
reasonably well (Isaac 2002; Turral et al. 2004).
31The World Bank also seems to have recently embraced the idea that big projects carry high risks but may also promise high rewards
(Briscoe 2003).
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Carl Bauer’s (2004) comprehensive review of the
Chilean experience confirms that, with some
exceptions, water markets have been largely
inactive, that farmers were uninterested in trading
“surplus-rights” or saving water to free up some of
it for other uses.32 The most active basin is the
Limari river basin, where significant reallocation
between agriculturalists has taken place. Most
transactions, however, are short-term reallocation
between the irrigators who get their supply of
water from the same reservoir. Another
successful implementation of transfers has
been observed in the Maipo basin, close to
Santiago. Alicera et al. (1999) showed that
between 1990 and 1997, 4 percent of the water
rights held in the upper Maipo and Mapocho
basins has been traded (or 7% of non-municipal
water), half of these being acquired by
municipal utilities. China also started
experimenting with inter-provincial trading of
water but soon discovered the implications in
terms of return-flow and environmental impact
(Fu and Hu 2002).
While empirical evidence suggests that water
markets have been far less active than expected
and have often failed to bear the fruits expected
by their proponents, it is worth noting that
positive experience is confined to countries (e.g.,
USA, Australia, Chile, etc.,) with a strong legal,
institutional and regulatory background and
relatively wealthy stakeholders. Proposals for
their adoption in countries where hydrologic data
are scarce, physical infrastructure is lacking, and
states have weak monitoring and enforcement
capacity, are unrealistic. One may question why
states that have allegedly failed to allocate water
efficiently would be capable of creating the
numerous preconditions and safeguards needed
to ensure fair and transparent markets (Molle
2004a; Sindzingre 2002). The societal reasons
why government agencies perform poorly are the
same reasons why privatization and markets are
unlikely to succeed or be equitable, notably lack
of transparency and accountability, excessive
weight of economic interests in political life, and
barriers to the regulation of user practices,
corruption, etc.
It is beyond the scope of this report to review
the arguments for and against water markets.
Prerequisites to the definition of water rights have
legal, physical and political dimensions that are
often overlooked by those who stress the benefits
of a formalization of water rights. While
mechanisms to allow flexibility in allocation have
always developed at a scale where social control
and hydraulic infrastructures makes it possible, it
is doubtful that fully-fledged markets will
constitute a major tool for the reallocation of
water in the near future, especially in developing
countries (Frederik 1998; Dellapenna 2000;
Livingston 1995; Meinzen-Dick and Appasamy
2002; Molle 2004a).
Contingency Planning and Temporary
Transfers
Conflicts between cities and agriculture surface
primarily during water crises, when the share
diverted by the former rises from a low average
to a much larger share. This implies that
permanent transfers of rights are often not
necessary (Savenije and van der Zaag 2002).
Agricultural and nonagricultural uses can usually
coexist, if shares are expressed in terms of
averages. Emphasis should be placed on the
design and provision of mechanisms to
compensate farmers for losses and deprivation
that will occur in times of shortage. This is easier
to achieve than permanent expropriation of
agricultural water, while allowing for a more
efficient use of water.
32Several authors have also shown that: little provision has been made to address third-party impacts (rights to return flows are not
recognized); record-keeping and registration are inadequate; infrastructure is ill-developed; and in-stream uses (e.g., power generation)
have not been adequately considered.
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It must be realized, however, that the
“average discourse” used by the state or by cities
to tap other sources precludes, or goes against,
the preparation of mitigation measures: since the
impact of diversions is obscured by presenting it
in average terms (as in Seville, Monterrey and
Chennai), there is little incentive to develop
explicit contingency plans for dry years, which
would shed a different light on the future impact
of diversions.33 Technical agencies, too, are
reluctant to engage in debates that reveal that
domestic supply is not fully reliable. This fails to
raise the awareness of the population that periods
of shortage are normal occurrences, and that
these occurrences will become more frequent as
the basin closes and also the fact, that climate
change is likely to compound the situation due to
an increase in inter-annual climatic variability.
Projections are still routinely based on average
values drawn from historical series of hydrologic
data even though there is now a general
perception that the past is not a good guide to
the future (Bakker 2000). More irregularity means
that there is a need for more storage and
interannual regulation so as to ensure “headroom”
in the face of extreme events: the bad news is
that this means less water should be tapped on
average, compounding pressure on resources.
Drought-management strategies are,
therefore, needed to provide an early warning of
possible shortages and as a predefined set of
actions for different conditions (Frederiksen 1992).
If priorities are well-established and transparent
information provided, negotiations can prepare for
such arrangements and avoid the outcry and
political crises that often accompany severe
water shortages. The issue should, therefore, be
made public and discussed, so that adjustments
are planned beforehand and implemented
smoothly as necessary. Of course, if local
conditions, notably great irregularity of supply and
a high demand relatively to the average water
available make the occurrence of such
compensation schemes too frequent, then there
is a case for permanent transfers or supply
augmentation.
In developing countries, bulk allocation is
generally controlled by the state and reallocation
is made easier since no individual rights are held.
If rights are held, as in Australia or western USA,
then market mechanisms are necessary to allow
some of these to be transferred. Market-based
options make less sense in contexts where
distribution of water to bulk users such as cities,
industries and irrigation schemes is centrally
operated. Negotiations are more readily achieved
on an ad hoc basis if only a few parties are
concerned (very often a crisis pits one or two
irrigation schemes against one city). The review
found that compensation can be discussed and
negotiated irrespective of the degree of
formalization of rights and of the type of
government. What matters is the relative
bargaining power of each party. If one party
wields too much power then it is likely to override
other users while, in the opposite cases,
negotiations are more common outcomes. Many
Chinese municipalities or states, or cities like
Seville, have had to pay compensation in times
of drought. Transactions between private and
municipal parties can also be mediated by the
state, as in the case of the “drought bank” set up
in 1991 in California, where networks of canals
and pumping stations allowed the reallocation of
water among a few (30) big contractors (see Wahl
1993; Teerink and Nakashima 1993).
Participation and Environmental
Justice
The displacement of agriculture and nature by
growing cities/industries and the contamination of
freshwater have heavy social, environmental, and
health costs. The magnitude and the distribution
of these externalities is very much a reflection of
33Similarly, according to White et al. (2001), members of parliaments in the USA are also reluctant to move funds from crisis to drought
management because crisis relief is a way to send money home to their constituents.
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the governance structure of the society. The
“stamina” and the mobilization of the “people
living downstream,” and the political space offered
to disenfranchised groups to voice their concern
are paramount. They ultimately not only
determine whether externalities are recognized
and internalized, but also who pays for that.
A more equitable distribution of benefits and
costs is possible when a more inclusive and
informed process of decision making on
infrastructure development or water reallocation
options is observed. A shift from supply-oriented
paternalistic development to process-oriented
approaches leading to “informed consent” (Delli
Priscoli 2004) is materializing, but slowly.
Deliberative development enables a better
definition of social choice but can only develop in
a political configuration where redistribution of
power is possible. Because WS&S projects
usually involve large outlays of money, decision-
making remains largely centralized and
technology-oriented. Participatory decision-making
is also essential in case of pre-existing
customary water rights. Meinzen-Dick and
Appasamy (2002) emphasize that beyond the
assumed users there are a variety of often-
disregarded users who derive both direct and
indirect benefits and who may be impacted by
decisions on allocation (Meinzen-Dick and
Appasamy 2002; Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan
2002).
Another lesson from the cases reviewed is
that lack of transparency in hydrological data
tends to compound conflicts and hinders
settlements and negotiations. This is clear in the
Kerala case of the Coca-Cola bottling factory and
also in Katmandu, where a rather benign river
diversion scheme was nevertheless the object of
much confrontation. Examples from India (where
state data on federal rivers are hardly available)
or Central Asia (Wegerich 2004) show that data
are crucial to inform participatory planning, which
is precisely the reason why they are often not
made public by bureaucracies that try to evade
scrutiny or accountability.
Urban water management has benefited from
users’ involvement and participation. A number of
innovative experiments have emerged in the past
two decades (e.g., Orangi project in Pakistan,
Kumasi in Ghana [PSE 1998], Onitsha in Nigeria
[Okun 1991], and Pune in India: see also
UNESCO 2003, Narayan 1995, Nicol 2000)
although these have often been confined to a few
success stories and achievements in a broader
context have, in general, been limited. Attempts
to combine both development and environmental
preservation, sophisticated multi-objective and
participatory planning (including risk management
and social learning) rather than elitist, reactive
and deterministic traditional planning have yet to
result in “the paradigm shift and the change in
mindsets” needed (Vlachos and Braga 2001). A
change of focus, from water disposal and
treatment to conservation and recycling of
resources, is emerging but has yet to materialize
on a significant scale.
Environmental justice must become a central
concern so as to avoid the situation where water
transfers from agriculture, displacement of nature,
and the emission of pollutants by cities and
industries impact unduly on poor and marginal
populations. Little headway will be achieved
without participation and political empowerment of
the concerned population.
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Conclusions
This report has analyzed the nature of urban
water scarcity, distinguishing between municipal
and industrial uses; and has investigated whether
and how cities increase supply as demand grows,
and to what extent possible supply constraints
are causally linked to agriculture.
Municipal water use. M&I uses tend to be
considered jointly. Both have physical, economic
and political dimensions but in important respects
they are distinct. Urban water scarcity is typically
reflected in recurring (short-term) crises that are
widely publicized by the media. Many cities have
deficient WS&S infrastructure, coverage of
networks is partial and part of the population
survives with minimal supply. Recurring crises
trigger restrictions, transfers from distant sources,
and/or a flurry of tanker activity. Intermittent
supply of tap water strikes the imagination as a
mark of sheer scarcity, although it is often simply
a way of minimizing leakage and is often offset
by individual in-house storage.
Many cities have difficulties in finding water
of adequate quality in their surroundings, signaling
a degree of physical scarcity: some have
developed in dry areas and have rapidly
outstripped nearby resources; others, although
located in wet regions, are sited in upper-
catchment areas and have to divert water from
distant basins. Yet, despite occasional cases of
physical scarcity, it is apparent that many water-
short cities have been water-short during most of
the history of their development, from a
population of a few tens of thousands to several
million; and that many others are surrounded by
abundant water but yet have large parts of their
population with precarious access to water supply
and sanitation.
Debates on WS&S (e.g., the Camdessus
Report) unambiguously revolve around who is to
pay for these services, not where water will come
from. The underdevelopment of water supply is
first and foremost one of economic scarcity, a
financial issue, with complex and important
questions of political economy on how the
provision of public goods is decided and funded.
The questions are primarily who benefits and who
pays (private versus public, national versus
international, federation versus states, nation
state versus regional/local entities, users versus
general tax payers, poor versus rich, etc.,). In
that sense, rather than being merely a question of
available capital, the issue translates into political
questions: a) Will the processes of
democratization and development of civil
societies be able to shift the power balance so
that basic needs and environmental preservation
are given greater consideration? b) Will design,
implementation, management and financing
arrangements evolve so as to allow the spreading
of benefits?
The response to these questions depends on
the context and on the capacity and power of
decision makers and stakeholders to shift costs
and benefits in ways that are politically and/or
financially rewarding to them. The struggle for
clean water and environmental preservation,
therefore, is a political process whereby “who
pays what” is defined and, in which public
pressure plays a major role. Historians of the
Industrial Revolution stress that European urban
elites improved WS&S only when they were
affected or threatened by epidemics, loss of
aesthetic well-being and possible social unrest of
the labor force. In contrast, the situation in the
South today can also, in part, be linked to a
weak “threat from below” and to the limited costs
to economic elites by the expansion of slums
together with an increase in water use at low
levels. That many cities with poor WS&S still
grow at the highest rates show that poor water
supply is unfortunately not a hindrance, or that
migrants are pushed to cities with no other
choice.
The proportion of the urban population living
in unauthorized areas is typically 30–60 percent,
amounting to a staggering 1 billion (Lundqvist et
al. 2001). With 80–90 percent of world population
growth expecting to take place in cities, it is very
doubtful that the financial resources needed to
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ensure WS&S facilities to cities will be secured
or made available.
Industrial use. While water supply constraints
may bring hardship to some urban citizens, it
does not appear that they impact significantly on
economic investments and industrial
development. Industries receive priority in supply
due to their economic importance. They may be
affected for short periods, in times of severe
drought, but this generally occurs after supply to
other sectors has been curtailed or even
discontinued. In addition, industries widely rely on
groundwater (better quality and higher supply
security) and are, therefore, partly “de-linked” in
the short term from allocation decisions or
droughts.
Water-related constraints to industrial
investments are yet to be documented, except
where arid conditions preclude development of
water-intensive industries. Industries are
invariably given priority, or granted permits for
drilling deep wells, because of the jobs created,
the taxes contributed, and the political clout of
industrialists. It is doubtful, therefore, that
significant increases in water availability resulting
from reallocating irrigation water would make a
radical difference to economic activity. Contrary
to received wisdom on state failure, states do
give priority to cities and industries because of
the economic logic and elite interests. Transfers
do occur and the alleged economic benefits
waiting to be realized are often much inflated. In
other words, opportunity costs of irrigation water
are positive – but only weakly positive – at the
margin and once urban demands are satisfied
these opportunity costs fall to zero. The often
stated problem of sectoral allocation as a
significant hindrance to economic development is
perhaps only a hasty generalization of the
situation in western USA (where the prior-
appropriation doctrine has tended to lock up water
use in low-value uses) to contexts where
centralized management has by and large
ensured intersectoral reallocation. That investment
in nonagricultural activities is only constrained at
the margin, if at all, because of effective
reallocation/prioritization or supply augmentation,
does not mean, however, that this is occurring in
an optimal or even a desirable manner.
Cities increase supply by several means. The
evidence gathered from the cases compiled in
this report shows that regardless of whether cities
also engage in demand management programs
(reducing losses, increasing prices, etc.,), they
seem to be successful in increasing their supply,
although ways to achieve this increase are
varied, including:
• Increase in supply by constructing new
reservoirs on nearby streams.
• Bringing water from distant basins
through interbasin transfers (aqueducts,
tunnels, pumping stations, etc.,).
• Tapping local or distant aquifers, often in
an unsustainable way.
• Diverting water away from agricultural,
environmental and other uses.
With the exception of river basins where there
is still abundant uncommitted water, these
increases in supply tend to have pervasive third-
party impacts on existing users when water is
taken, rather than traded. They also impact on
the environment – although the environment is
impacted far more by irrigation – in terms of
aquifer depletion, land subsidence, salinity
intrusion in coastal aquifers, degraded
ecosystems and disappearing wetlands. Clearly,
conflicts do not occur only between cities and
agriculture but, more critically so, between these
two sectors and the environment. Inter-basin
transfers have impacts in terms of foregone
economic value in the giver basin, and transfers
from agricultural use among farmers themselves.
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Reallocation from agriculture is effective. As most
analysts observe, agriculture loses out and will be
increasingly deprived of water. The impact of this
reallocation has been varied:
• Farmers and/or scheme managers have
adjusted to growing scarcity by improving
irrigation efficiency at farm or scheme
level, or by changing cropping patterns.
• Farmers have been pushed into (over)
exploiting groundwater, or diverting more
surface water to the detriment of nature.
• Farmers have been pushed into using
wastewater (or treated wastewater).
• Farmers have been out-pumped (by
falling aquifers) or driven out of business
by reduced supplies of surface water.
Reallocation of water out of agriculture follows
several modes (gradual or outright, minor or
major, surreptitious or open, short-term or
permanent, with or without compensation)
depending on the hydrological characteristics of
the source, the definition of rights/allocation, and
the power of the cities/state to reorder this
allocation. These different modes shape the
impact and the response of society to these
reallocations.
Mechanisms needed for short-term reallocation.
Conflicts between cities and agriculture often only
come to the fore in times of shortage, which is
due to a combination of: a) a dry spell; b)
careless management; and, c) inappropriate
consumption practices. Such shortages become
increasingly frequent in over-committed basins
where no “slack” is available to address the
vagaries of the weather, and are all likely to be
compounded by climatic change. In a great
majority of cases, priority in use is de facto given
to urban areas; in some other cases, because
rights are fuzzy or ill-defined, because water
sources come under different jurisdictions, or
because irrigation holds “senior” rights,
reallocation (through market-like mechanisms or
otherwise) is needed because nonagricultural
water demand tends to be inelastic and of higher
value. Contingency plans to reallocate water and
compensate users in such circumstances need to
be prepared, discussed and established in
advance, whenever hydraulic connectivity exists.
However, there is a reluctance of governments
and line agencies to discuss such matters as
contingency planning since this would expose the
hidden consequences of reallocation. It would
also undermine the professional legitimacy of
these agencies and faith in their capacity to
provide a reliable supply. Nevertheless negotiated
drought-management strategies must be
established and compensation to farmers made
explicit in advance, in order to avoid turmoil and
conflicts at times of drought. Such arrangements
can often be negotiated between the parties
concerned even when the prerequisites to
establishing a more complex market for water
rights are not met. Indeed, it is observed that
compensation for temporary transfers are often
negotiated, irrespective of whether rights are
strictly defined or not and of the assumed power
of the state.
The politics of reallocation. Cities will continue to
redirect neighboring water to their own use and to
tap increasingly distant sources, sometimes
bureaucratically, sometimes through offering
compensation and, context allowing, by acquiring
transferable water use rights. The option
ultimately chosen by decision makers is likely to
follow the “path of least resistance” that cities
encounter in their search for water. Economists in
general, and market advocates in particular,
rightly emphasize that, in some cases, expensive
interbasin transfers or distant reservoirs are
implemented while reallocating nearby agricultural
water would be financially (and sometimes
environmentally) sounder.
That such choices are made, however, is not
merely due to ill-informed decision-making or
vested interests, it is also indicative of the fact
that buying formal or even informal water rights,
and even more so de facto expropriating existing
water uses, entail transactions and political costs
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that are much higher than usually recognized. To
equate “benefit to the society” with the highest
return per unit of water is often too simplistic.
The view that markets may neutrally reconcile all
values and that “once trading water rights
becomes a reality, conflict resolution by politics
can be eliminated” (McIntosh 2003) is probably
naïve and misleading, when generalized. Politics
is unlikely to disappear. The western USA shows
that even when prerequisites for defining water
rights and trading are met, one cannot expect
automatic and anonymous transactions to prevail,
except under very particular conditions.
Irrespective of the benefits of and constraints on
markets, case by case transactions are much
more likely to remain mediated by political
processes of negotiation rather than by
impersonal market-like transactions (Colby 1993;
Kenney 2003). While politics is often construed
in a negative sense because of its rent-seeking
and pork-barrel dimensions, these aspects must
be checked by democratization of decision
making and increased public access to data, so
that political mediation becomes an effective
way of balancing antagonistic interests and world
views, rather than a way to further vested
interests. Such a process is site-specific and
mirrors, among other things, the nature of the
physical setting, dominant ideologies, the
importance and clout of the civil society, the
local political economy and the legal
environment.
Degradation of water sources. Unchecked use of
water has led to the degradation of resources
both in terms of quality and groundwater
reserves. This worrisome fact means that, at
some point in time, cities will not only have to
cater to growing needs but also to find
substitutes for exhausted, salinized or polluted
sources of water. Environmental degradation
constrains supply of water to the cities and is
compounded by contaminated wastewater emitted
by them. Although treatment of water is one
possible answer, only 10 percent of effluents in
developing countries are treated and the costs
involved are massive. It is, therefore, likely that
groundwater depletion, which has so far allowed a
large portion of urban water supply, will
increasingly generate backlash in future, with
pressure shifting back to surface water. Again,
the conflict between human use in general, and
the environment in particular, is perhaps more
critical than that between agriculture and cities.
Allocation stress revisited. The frequent
statement that reallocating a minor fraction of
irrigation water to cities would suffice to cater to
the needs of people with poor water supply
conditions is deceptive: both the arithmetic and
the causality are erroneous. Much of the water
used by irrigation is diverted at times and places
where there is no alternative use and a large part
of return flows – in water short basins – is reused
downstream. Our contention is that the causal
association between, on the one hand, the
insufficient and precarious conditions of access
to water in “thirsty cities,” highlighted in times of
crises, and, on the other, water scarcity allegedly
caused by a wasteful irrigation sector, is largely
misleading. Rather than considering that urban
masses lack water because it is difficult to take
water away from agriculture (generalizing the
particular case of the western USA), we argue
that transfers do occur and are volumetrically
limited, and that the problem (in developing
countries) lies elsewhere: not so much in the lack
of water per se but, rather, in the lack of capital,
itself a notion relative to the local political
economy and distribution of power in society.
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The Western USA
Water allocation and rights in the western USA
differ depending on the state but are generally
based on the prior appropriation rights system
that emerged in mining camps in the mid-
nineteenth century. To avoid violent disputes
between established and new mines, prior
appropriation ensured that water once diverted
(or “appropriated”) from a stream would remain
available to the original user (Kenney 2003). The
right is absolute but subject to the test of
“reasonable use.” Diverting more water than is
reasonably necessary is considered wasteful
and, therefore, not part of the right.
Consequently, users are not encouraged to save
water as this would generate an “excess” that
would legally return to the public domain
(Anderson and Snyder 1997). Likewise, users
with water in excess of their needs are reluctant
to publicize such a situation—even to enter into
a market transaction—for fear of losing their
right (Green and Hamilton 2000). This “first-in-
time, first-in-right” system grants the first
settlers “senior” rights (defined as “water duty”
related to the area put under beneficial use),
whereas later ones are only given “junior” rights
on any water (possibly) remaining after the
former are served (and their use is, therefore,
subject to hydrologic variability). As many of the
senior rights are historically held by irrigation
districts, this legal system now entails
constraints on the reallocation of water to towns
(Frederik 1998; Huffaker et al. 2000).
At first sight, it might appear contradictory
that problems of transfer occur precisely where
private rights have been defined most rigorously
and where, in general, trading has been made
possible. In fact, a number of conditions are
generally attached to market transactions of
water. The public trust doctrine, which allows the
protection of the public’s interest in fishing or
navigation, is now extended to incorporate
recreation and environmental preservation as well.
This inclusion was made to offset the difficulties
resulting from the nonrecognition of in-stream/
nondiversionary use in the prior appropriation
system. The Federal Reserve right doctrine has
been used to claim water rights for national
parks, federal land and Indian reservations
(Livingston 1995). Some states and counties
have passed area-of-origin protection laws that
prohibit or limit trans-basin diversions in the name
of “the public interest,” or in order to protect local
economies, culture and environment. More
difficulties arise when reallocation, transfers and/
or infrastructure concern federal rivers or several
states. Local, state and federal laws often conflict
and transactions or interventions may give way to
lengthy court hearings and litigation. Issues of
water quality, reliability, timeliness and also of
culture and politics bedevil what seems at first
sight a simple transaction between willing buyers
and sellers.
Market proponents like Anderson and Snyder
(1997) dismiss the “water is special” argument,
holding that all these conditionalities and
overlapping of authorities constrain economic
efficiency, engender misallocation and undermine
the security of rights. Interpretation of fuzzy
concepts such as “public interest,” “beneficial
use,” “wasteful use,” and “detrimental to the
public welfare” lead to endless and costly court
cases. More cautious analysts admit that in
closed basins reallocation of water necessarily
modifies the hydrological cycle, with frequent
third-party impacts on other appropriators and on
the environment (Huffaker et al. 2000; Howe et al.
1990; Kenney 2003; Dellapenna 2000; Livingston
1995; Libecap 2003; see Rosegrant and Ringler
1998 for a discussion of possible impacts of
water transfers).
Annex
How Cities Obtain Water: Selected Experiences
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Social scientists also warn that in the
western USA, water is not just a factor of
production but the “stuff of life.” Rural counties
are doomed to perish without their agricultural
base, with a consequent loss of jobs,
opportunities and the fiscal base (Oggins and
Ingram 1990; Brown and Ingram 1987; Klein-
Robbenhaar 1996). Water is a link between
people, and individual decisions often have
collective consequences. The transfer of a
fraction of water rights attached to acequias (the
traditional communal irrigation systems) to
nonagricultural investors in New Mexico, for
example, weakens the whole system, in particular
with regard to maintenance requirements (Klein-
Robbenhaar 1996; NNLMS 2000). Frederik (1998)
reports that “when farmers want to sell water to
cities, irrigation districts resist, fearing the loss of
agricultural jobs that accompany rural water use,”
while Wahl (1993) acknowledges that “most
agricultural water districts have viewed the
potential for water transfers only very tentatively
out of concern over the security of their water
rights and potentially adverse effects on the
districts and local communities.”
The West (and also some other parts of the
USA) encounters severe competition between
agriculture, cities and the environment. However,
shortage of water in the deserts of Arizona is a
relative notion. Phoenix34 enjoys the supply of the
Central Arizona Project (CAP) that brings water
from the Colorado river and exhibits a
conspicuous consumption rate of over 1,000 l/c/
day (still 20% lower than its rate in the mid-
1970s)—(Copenhaver 2003). The city displays
golf courses that are watered year-round, 200
parks, 50 of which are irrigated, 28 public
swimming pools and about 20,000 residents who
drench extensive lawns. Even Tucson, which fully
depended on groundwater until the recent arrival
of CAP water and has water fees twice as high
as in Phoenix, is consuming 727 l/c/day, which
can be compared with the common average
standard consumption of 130 l/c/day in European
cities. Some cities like Las Vegas, sited in the
desert, with a per capita consumption of 1,200 l/day,
defy common sense and need ever more distant
transfers to support their growth. Others are
situated in wet eastern regions but even so do
not escape water problems. Atlanta and Georgia,
for example, face problems of water supply (Vaux
2004) but these are mainly due to polluted water
sources, delayed maintenance and a decrepit
network. Atlanta is located in an upper
watershed and draws 85 percent of its water
from the Chattahoochee river. It has seen its
population increase from 1.3 million in 1960 to
over 4.1 million in 2000 (Segal 2003). The
struggle for additional resources pits the
business community against environmentalists35
(Wall 2003) and the state legislature banned
interbasin transfers in 2001 for fear that Atlanta
would divert water away from other poorer parts
of the state, which still have available resources
(Williams 2002).
State policies have varied in response to
changing resource pressures and the rise of
environmentalism. In the late nineteenth century
there was a fear that speculation and monopoly
practices were threatening the public interest and
several states, following Wyoming, banned water
transfers. The situation has now shifted towards
allowing greater use of transfers, an option that is
unavoidable in a context where most, if not all,
water is already appropriated (Gardner 2003). The
complexity of water issues, however, means that
ownership and administration of water rights in
the West remains in a state of flux (Gardner
2003). A balanced view is given by the report
“Water in the West: The Challenge for the Next
Century” issued by the Western Water Policy
Review Commission (1998). The report sees the
voluntary water transfers occurring throughout the
West as helpful “to meet the demand for new
34“Before they even land, people flying into Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport can see a 560-foot jet of water bursting from an
artificial lake. The jet is listed in the Guinness Book of Records as the highest fountain” (US Water News Online 2003).
35Atlanta’s proposal to increase withdrawals from the Chattahoochee and Flint rivers aroused controversy because of potential
downstream impacts on the rich Apalachicola Bay estuary (Fitzhugh and Richter 2004).
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urban supplies and for environmental flows in a
manner that is both fair and efficient,” but also
acknowledges that “water transfers that occur
without attention to their potentially damaging
effects on local communities, economies and
environments can be harmful to ecosystems and
social systems that are dependent on irrigation
economies.”
In a context like the western USA, where
individual water rights are defined, water markets
or other types of transactions and transfers
appear as one of the major options to reallocate
water despite the often high transactions (e.g.,
legal) costs. Since most senior rights are held by
irrigation districts, changing demographic and
economic conditions warrant a permanent transfer
of rights (Frederick 1998; Schiller and Fowler
1999). However, the transaction costs and
impediments to transfers must be seen not as
useless bureaucratic meddling but as a
permanent search for an elusive equilibrium
between private and public interests and for a
trade-off between people’s values (Emel 1990;
Brown 1997). Thus the particular experience of
the western USA led to a specific system of
rights, with its advantages and drawbacks. Prior
appropriation means that agricultural activities not
only often have priority but also quantitative rights
than cannot be circumvented or redistributed.
This defines a specific situation of sectoral
tension, which is quite removed from the reality
of developing countries (and also many
industrialized countries), where with few
exceptions water is bureaucratically allocated and
no formal rights are held.
Europe
Numerous examples can be drawn from the
European experience. In contrast to the western
USA, for which conflicts between irrigation and
urban uses date from the earliest stages of
development, water rights in Europe have evolved
over time and in only a few cases have
significant rural-urban conflicts emerged. Two
cases perhaps suffice to illustrate how European
cities in arid regions have secured their water.
Athens
Athens provides a good example of a city that
had to look further afield for new supplies, while
at the same time there was no significant
irrigation use in the vicinity from which water
could have been diverted. The Marathon dam, the
main source of supply, was constructed in 1925.
From the late 1950s to the early 1970s several
distant sources (the Yliki lake and the Mornos
dam, 187 km away) were tapped through
aqueducts and Athens enjoyed an abundant water
supply until the 1989–1991 drought (Kallis and
Coccossis 2002). Heightened anxiety about
supply reserves—that were at some point
announced to be just enough for 170 days—
provided the context to push for supply
augmentation (the Evinos dam, and also an
infamous water-transportation project by oil
tankers which would have benefited private and
political interests; see Karavitis 1998) as well as
for a demand management program that included
raising population awareness, price increases and
paving the way for privatization (Kaika 2003).
State management and planning of resources has
allowed the capture of distant sources with only
limited conflicts with agriculture.36
Seville
Seville is located in the Guadalquivir river basin,
southern Spain, which has a storage capacity
that amounts to 84 percent of the annual average
runoff. Seville has a population of 1.3 million and
receives its supply from reservoirs on right bank
tributaries of the Guadalquivir. The main river and
the aquifer are too contaminated to serve as
sources for domestic supply (Del Moral and
36Agricultural producers and local authorities in the area around the Mornos reservoir are complaining against the strict measures that
have been applied in order to protect the quality and safety of water in the reservoir. The scheme thus constrains potential agricultural
development in the area (Kallis 2004).
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Giansante 2000). Despite the relative aridity of
the region and the occurrence of about one
severe drought per decade (e.g., 1974–1976,
1980–1983 and 1992–1995) the city has enjoyed
a rather comfortable per capita supply of
between 285 and 425 l/c/day since 1975
(compare this with the end of the nineteenth
century when it was no more than 30 to 40 l/c/
day [Del Moral 1998]). In the drought years of
1976 and 1994, some transfer of water from the
Pintado dam allocated to the Viar irrigation
scheme was achieved after much confrontation
and paying due compensation to farmers. In the
last three droughts, agreements were also
reached with the hydropower agency regarding
the interruption and scheduling of releases from
a dam usually not tapped for the supply of the
city (Del Moral 1998). Droughts have been used
to stress the existence of climatic risk and the
need to augment storage and supply, despite the
facts that: a) supply has never been severely
curtailed; b) the rate of unaccounted for water is
still as high as 36 percent; and c) the shortages
owe a lot to careless management of the
reservoirs, the delay in implementing supply
augmentation plans and the lack of contingency
planning (Sillero 1998).
China
Two-thirds of the 600 major cities are said to
experience water shortage (Xinhua 2004). But
bringing water to these cities has been hindered
by rising costs, and failure to keep pace with
rapidly growing demands, rather than by
agriculture failing to release the water it uses.
Indeed, there has been a substantial shift in the
balance of water use to nonagricultural uses.
Over the past 50 years, agricultural withdrawals
as a proportion of total water withdrawals have
decreased from a high of 97 percent in 1949 to
69 percent in 1998, and are projected to reach 54
percent in 2050 (Jin and Young 2001). This
reflects continued growth in nonagricultural uses
in combination with the completion of irrigation
development in water-abundant areas, as irrigable
land has run out. But on China’s northern plains,
one of the most severely water-stressed areas in
the world, it has also been associated, since
about the mid-1990s, with an absolute decline in
agricultural water withdrawals. In contrast,
domestic and industrial water use has continued
to increase at an annual rate of 12 percent and 5
percent, respectively, over the past two decades.
Although China has legislated for water rights
(GOC 1993), in practice this impressive
rebalancing has been achieved based on
predominantly centralized policy and allocation
mechanisms, with or without the payment of
compensation. As Lohmar et al. (2003) put it, the
“nation’s water policy is becoming increasingly
biased toward industry,” and the power vested in
the Ministry of Water Resources and at Provincial
level in practice allows reallocation of water to
urban use.
Hong et al. (2001) describe a large irrigation
district in Hubei where the proportion of water
received by agriculture from the main reservoir
declined from 64 to 35 percent between 1990 and
2001 due to reallocation of water to hydropower
generation and industrial and domestic uses. The
study of the Zhanghe reservoir (Yangtze river
basin), by Loeve et al. (2003) provides a good
example of transfer out of agriculture. While the
reservoir was supplying an average of 600 Mm3
to irrigation in the 1960s, it now provides only 200
Mm3, the difference being transferred to
hydropower, followed by industry and municipal
use (figure 1). Despite this severe decrease in
supply, over the same period the cropped area
declined by only 32 percent while yields have
doubled. This adjustment was made possible by
local storage (ponds and small reservoirs), some
recycling of drainage water by pumping, the
adoption of high- yield varieties of rice, double
cropping and water-saving rice growing
techniques. Consequently, water productivity has
risen threefold (Hong et al. 2001).
In Kaifeng district, in the Yellow river basin,
the share of agriculture moved from 87 percent in
1968 to 63 percent in 2000. In absolute terms,
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water use is roughly at the same level as in the
late 1960s when the Yellow river was providing 77
percent of total supply. However, the river now
only supplies 31 percent, the shortfall being
provided by groundwater (Loeve et al. 2003).
Indeed, more than 75 percent of the total water
use in the Kaifeng City area now comes from
groundwater, which has allowed municipal and
industrial demand to be met with minimal
competition from agriculture (16% of Yellow river
diversion in recent years against 4% in the late
60s). However, the cone of depression created by
over-pumping is likely to impact on agricultural
wells. Surface transfers have been limited but
transfers will eventually occur through
underground flows.
In Yiwu city (in the Zheijang Province), the
municipal government provided the neighboring
city of Dongyang US$24 million in construction
funds in exchange for a permanent right to a
water supply of 50 Mm3 from one of its
reservoirs. The money was used to increase the
height of the dam and for conservation measures,
principally canal lining (Liu 2003). Another
example of transfer for drought relief in 2003 was
the purchase by local governments in the
Zhanghe basin of 30 Mm3 of water from five
reservoirs located in the Henan Province (Liu
2003). Yet another example is provided by the
Tsingtao city in Shandong Province. Despite
construction of an expensive surface water
transfer scheme from the Yellow river, the City
Authorities were able to secure supplies at a
lower cost from local irrigation schemes, which
were compensated. The transfer project remains
unused (World Bank 2002).
As a temporary measure, until the end of this
decade when northern China will get about 20
Bm3 diverted from the Yangtze river via the first
phase of the South-North Transfer Scheme, the
central government has embarked on a US$2.7
billion program to divert water from Shanxi and
Hebei Provinces to Beijing (People’s Daily Online
2003). Understandably, such massive re-
appropriation has encountered significant
opposition from areas releasing supplies and
compensation to the areas affected has proven to
be essential.
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FIGURE 1.
Zhanghe Irrigation System, Hubei, China. Annual water allocations.
Source: Loeve et al. 2003
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If there are instances where such reallocation
was hindered by the resistance of rural entities37,
the overall numbers suggest that urban
development ends up getting the upper hand.
Even where water shortages are extreme, as in
Tianjin city, water has placed few constraints on
economic growth, which has been extraordinarily
rapid and has even exceeded that for the nation
as a whole. Conflicts are generally resolved by
increasing the authority of higher-level
administrative units so that the unit of decision-
making is broad enough to internalize the conflict
(Lohmar et al. 2003). In other cases, Water
Bureaus with competency and authority across
sectors mediate the allocation adjustments,
mitigating their impact with additional
conservation and/or supply-augmentation
measures, sometimes also compensating
farmers.
Whatever the mechanisms employed, urban
uses have generally secured the supplies that are
needed to underpin rapid economic growth. Rising
urban demand has been met by supply
augmentation, conservation measures, interbasin
diversions and transfers from agriculture.
South-east Asia
Thailand
In Thailand, the growth of the Bangkok
Metropolitan Area (BMA) generated a rise in
demand from 0.46 Mm3/day in 1978 to
approximately 7.5 Mm3/day in 2000, a sixteen
fold increase over 22 years (Molle et al. 2001).
This demand has been met by increasing the
share of the Chao Phraya river flow allocated to
the city (up to 45–50 m3/s) and by using
groundwater. There are no reliable data on the
exact volume extracted from the aquifer but it is
generally estimated at 3 Mm3/day in the BMA.38 A
total of 95 percent of the water used in the
manufacturing sector comes from underground
water (Christensen and Boon-Long 1994). Future
demand will be met from the adjacent “water-rich”
Mae Klong basin via a canal39 with a planned
capacity of 45 m3/s, which will be reached in
2017. This indicates, first, that the priority given
to Bangkok has been readily translated into an
increased diversion of surface water (to the
detriment of irrigation since the amount available
in the dry season is reduced); and, second, that
the impact of the shift has been mitigated by
allowing industries to mine deep aquifers (at the
cost of land subsidence and sustainability; see
Nair 1991, Das Gupta and Babel 2005). Supply
augmentation will allow Bangkok to satisfy future
growth in demand. In parallel, it must be
mentioned that conservation programs have been
undertaken that aim to reduce unaccounted-for-
water in the reticulated system from the current
level of 40 percent. With 33,995 factories in
Bangkok and its surrounding provinces (Bangkok
Post 1999), and around 10 million inhabitants,
BMA’s growth has hardly been constrained by
water.
The city of Chiang Mai, too, has developed
its water supply by appropriating canal water from
nearby irrigation schemes. These provide 50,000
m3/day of the city supply (corresponding to 70%
of its supply), at the cost of reduction of supply
to irrigated areas, with an additional 30 percent
coming from the Ping River. Water flowing in the
main canal of the Mae Taeng irrigation system
37Lohmar et al. (2003) report the case of a factory that had to close because it failed to win priority of allocation over existing agricultural
activities. Page (2001) reports that a riot erupted in the eastern province of Shandong after officials cut off water supplies from a
reservoir used to irrigate crops.
38The Department of Mineral Resources (DMR), for the late 1980s, reports on a total of 9,000 wells extracting 1.3 Mm3/day. JICA
estimated 2.9 Mm3/day, based on consumption standards by category of factory, and TDRI (1990) concluded that they are probably
about 3 Mm3/day (compared to a safe yield of 1 Mm3/day [Bangkok Post 1999]).
39This transfer has met with the opposition of residents of the Mae Klong basin (Pongsudhirak 1994), especially when a water shortage
was experienced in the late 90s. However, the basin has two large storage dams, which, on average, are said to have a surplus of 30
percent (Kositsakulchai 2001). They can thus readily handle the diversion provided the dams are properly managed. More recently,
the population in the basin has received some implicit compensation through the funding of rural water schemes in some villages.
43
that follows the western boundary of the valley
has been gradually tapped by innumerable houses
and by the city of Chiang Mai. Likewise, around
5–10 percent of the water controlled by the Mae
Kuang dam, on the east of the valley, is now
transferred to the city, prompting complaints from
irrigators who are already water-stressed in the
dry season, when only one-third of the area can
be put under cultivation.
Malaysia
Malaysia’s urban and industrial development has
generated an annual growth in water demand of
12 percent in recent years (Abdullah 2005). The
city of Kuala Lumpur (KL) has a population of 1.4
million and relies entirely on surface water. KL’s
rivers have their sources in the Klang river basin
(in the neighboring state of Selangor), which
supports 1,500 major industrial premises
(Abdullah 2005). All residents in the city receive
24-hour piped water, and per capita consumption
is only 132 l/day. Despite high rainfall runoff that
feeds KL’s four main reservoirs, these can no
longer meet the rising water demand and as a
result water shortages have occasionally
occurred, notably in the dry season. In 1997/
1998, El Niño caused severe water shortages.
Lack of rain and high demand have depleted
water sources and caused rationing in parts of KL
and the Klang valley. As the agricultural water
use in the basin is almost negligible, little
reallocation was possible. In response to water
shortages, an interstate project to transfer water
from Pahang state to Selangor state has been
considered. The project includes a dam and the
transfer of around 1.5 Mm3 per day through a 45-
km tunnel from the Kelau river in Pahang to the
Langat river in Selangor. The diversion plan is
opposed by NGOs, which stress that the water
systems in KL and the state of Selengor have
leakage losses of 40 percent of supply and
wasted around 1 Mm3 of water per day in 2000
(FOE 2003). Activists also stress that the Kelau
dam would damage the Kelau river ecosystem
and require the resettlement of indigenous people
and 150 Malay farmers.
Philippines
Manila is another megacity that has continued to
expand despite an apparently constrained water
supply. It presents an interesting case not just
because 97 percent of the city supply is derived
from a single source—the multipurpose Angat
reservoir and the related Ipo dam—but also
because the Philippines has since 1976 had a
formal system of water entitlements based on
that of the western USA (“first-in-time, first-in
right,” see above) that, in principle, requires
reallocation to be formalized together with the
payment of appropriate compensation to those
deprived of their formal rights. The Angat dam is
managed by the National Power Corporation
(NPC) though power is now generated only as a
by-product of releases to Angat-Maasim irrigation
scheme (for which the National Irrigation
Administration [NIA] holds the original water right
of 3.1 Mm3/day) and Manila (for which the
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System
[MWSS] holds an original right of 1.9 Mm3/day)
— (NWRB 1996). NIA has been unable to utilize
its full entitlement due to lack of development,
flooding of low-lying areas and, though denied by
NIA, loss of irrigable land to urban sprawl. Under
the 1995 Water Crisis Act, therefore, MWSS
received an additional 1.4 Mm3 from NIA’s
unutilized right and the provisions of the Water
Code were strengthened to give Manila clear
priority at times of drought. Supplies to Angat
were augmented in 2000 by the trans-basin
Umiray-Angat Diversion Project, bringing MWSS’s
total supplies up to about 4 Mm3/day. Further
projects are planned to take this figure to 8.9
Mm3/day by 2024 (Bumatay 2003).
The supply to Manila is vulnerable to climatic
variation because of its dependence on a single
source that also serves other users. Manila has
secured its needs by a mix of reallocation,
refurbishment and new projects, and this may
well have been more costly than if more of
irrigation’s Angat entitlement had been formally
reallocated to Manila. Despite NIA denials, further
reallocations might be possible without adversely
affecting irrigation as urban sprawl encroaches
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further on agricultural land. As it is, disputes
invariably occur at times of drought with NIA
basing its case on prior rights and MWSS on its
legal primacy at times of scarcity. While the
institutional mechanisms for reallocation are in
place, they are insufficiently potent or detailed,
notably relating to compensation, to be generally
accepted. In practice, each drought becomes a
crisis that requires political intervention, resulting
in rationing not only for irrigators but also for
domestic consumers. The solution seems to be a
detailed compensation package agreed in
advance that anticipates, rather than responds to,
a drought (Young et al. 1996; McIntosh 2003).
Even then, reallocation from Angat has limits
since supply variability to Manila would increase
as its share of this single surface source rises.
Increased variability will ultimately prove
unacceptable and other sources will become
essential.
In addition to the problem of periodic
shortages, dissatisfaction with MWSS’s
performance led to the privatization of the
distribution system in 1997. This change,
however, has not been an uninterrupted success.
Severe financial and contractual problems have
led to heated legal disputes, which resulted in
one of the two concessionaires seeking early
termination. Water is costlier, the service poorer
and pollution more severe than they might have
been prior to the change (privatization). Moreover,
industries have installed boreholes to guard
against shortage, leading to saline intrusion and
subsidence. Despite these deficiencies, it is
claimed that overall daily water production rose
from 3.1 to 4.1 Mm3 between 1997-2002, the
population served rose from 7.2 to 9.4 million,
average water availability increased from 16 to 19
h/day and the delivered supply rose from about
150 to 180 l/c/day (JBIC 2003). During the
drought of 1997-1998, supply to 30,000 ha of
irrigated land was suspended for two seasons and
supply to the city fell by 34 percent and
availability to 4 hours/day (Espinueva 2003). With
high levels of non-revenue water persisting,
important areas remain poorly served and periodic
shortages are likely to continue. Manila remains
dependent on a single source and has to resort to
increasingly costly and distant interbasin transfers
to augment its supply. Even so, there is little
evidence that Manila’s economic expansion has
been or will be significantly constrained by its
water supply.
Indonesia
Kurnia et al. (2000) describe the case of the
Ciwalengke irrigation system, in the Bandung
district, which has seen its water gradually
diverted by local factories. These industries have
used a large array of legal and illegal measures
to tap water and have been little challenged by
local farmers or the administration. This can be
attributed, in part, to the social and political power
of the factory owners. It also reflects the
inappropriateness of the legal dispositions, the
mixed feelings of farmers who also benefit from
the job opportunities offered to their children and
higher prices for their land, and the limited
bargaining power of Water User Associations.
Other river diversions for the supply of the
Bandung city are also reported to have been
implemented without any consultation with the
farmers. Jakarta city has overexploited its
groundwater resources and, is now forced to
expand supply by constructing more dams in
neighboring (or sometimes distant) basins (Gany
2003).
South Asia
India
Chennai (Madras). Chennai is a text-book
example of how large cities located in water-short
areas resort to multiple means to access water,
though it still has one of the lowest levels of per
capita consumption in India if not in the world (68
l/c/day) with a supply limited to 3 h/day on
average (Brisset 2003). Chennai is mostly
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supplied from four tanks (Poondi, Cholavaram,
Red-Hills, and Chembarambakkam)40 and
groundwater (55%) derived from well-fields in the
Araniyar-Kortalaiyar basin and coastal aquifers as
well as from wells operated by municipal
corporations and from the 200,000 private wells in
the city (Krishnakumar 2001). In 1976, Tamil
Nadu reached agreement with Maharashtra,
Karnataka, and Andhra Pradesh on a supply from
the Krishna river via the Teluguganga canal, a
project envisioned since 1957. The project
encountered numerous technical, financial and
political problems (Mohanakrishnan 2003; Nikku
2004) and water from the Krishna only reached
Tamil Nadu in 1996. Ever since, supply has been
erratic and during the following 6 years it
amounted in total to no more than was supposed
to be delivered each separate year (1.4 Mm3)
under the agreement.41
Emergency measures taken during the
drought that started in 2000 and still assails the
state include pumping water from the Neyveli
aquifer and transporting it by lorry; purchasing
water from private agricultural wells in the vicinity
of the city (and buying wells themselves);
transporting water by tanker from the
Chengalpattu-Kolavai lake; bringing water from the
Mettur reservoir in the   Cauvery river basin, by
rail; and installing bore-wells and tanks to supply
water to slums (Government of Tamil Nadu 2001).
Other longer-term measures taken since the
1990s include: a) construction of dams on the
Kortalaiyar river to recharge aquifers; b)
renovation of networks to limit losses; c)
renovation of tanks and development of water
harvesting to increase local storage and recharge;
d) construction of two treatment plants in the
north of the city and reuse of wastewater; e)
desalinization through a battery of reverse
osmosis plants; f) use of both municipal and
2,000 private tankers for distribution; and g)
provision of rainwater harvesting systems to new
buildings (Ramakrishnan 2002b; Nair 2001).
Chennai is in the process of completing a
230-km long pipeline to bring water from the
Veeranam dam in the Cauvery river basin. It also
envisages diverting water from Pallipalayam, also
in the Cauvery basin and 400 km away, as well
as from rivers that are already in an extreme
state of scarcity (Government of Tamil Nadu
2001). This is despite the fact that Cauvery is the
most water-constrained major basin in India and
has been the subject of a longstanding dispute
between Tamil Nadu and Karnataka. Moreover, all
such diversions will impact on irrigation, notably
in the deltas that lie at the tail end of the river
systems.42 Well-fields supplying Chennai have
pumped out a number of farmers as well as local
water supply systems, like in Palayaseevaram
(Rodrigo 2004), which once had a water supply 24
h/day and now receives water of poor quality, and
that too only 1.5 h/day. There is no mention of
compensation being paid to the affected farmers
other than in the case of the direct diversion from
farm wells in the vicinity of the city.
Coimbatore. Coimbatore, also in Tamil Nadu, has
imported water from the western Ghats in Kerala
since the 1930s. In the early 1990s, it
implemented a diversion from the nearby Bhavani
40Cholavaram and Red-Hills were used earlier for irrigation but were tapped by the British, while farmers reverted to rainfed agriculture.
Poondi was built by the British for domestic use only, while Chembarambakkam is a large tank that is still used for irrigation. Its
capacity will be increased in order to store water diverted from the Krishna basin (Sakthivadivel 2004; The Financial Express 2003;
Nikku 2004). It is worth noting that irrigation rights of the areas under the Cholavaram and Red-Hills were duly acquired in the 1960s.
41The scheme was designed at a time when Krishna river water was not as (over)committed as today. Farmers located along the 400
km of the transbasin diversion—an arid area with a historic grievance against the more favored Krishna valley—employ illegal means
(breach of canal, pumping) and political pressure to get their share of water. Farmers in Andhra Pradesh, notably in the increasingly
deprived Krishna delta, oppose the diversion of water to a state that is outside the basin. Several agricultural areas are to receive
water from the Teleguganga canal and it is doubtful whether Chennai will ever get more water than during the last 6 or 7 years (Nikku
2004).
42Supply augmentation plans are designed “to prevent rainwater running off into the sea by constructing check dams, reservoirs,
percolation tanks, etc., to store surplus water in Koratalaiyar, Cooum, Adyar and Palar rivers.” There is hardly any surplus in these
rivers and water will directly or indirectly be taken from irrigation. Likewise the 180 Mm3 to be taken from the Veeranam tank are
unlikely to correspond to “excess water,” as it is claimed.
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river, a tributary of the Cauvery, despite the
preexisting use of this water for irrigation below
the downstream Bhavani Sagar dam (Lundqvist
1993).
Hyderabad. A survey by the World Bank and the
Confederation of Indian Industries concluded that
Andhra Pradesh (AP) had the third best
investment climate among major Indian states
and another survey rated Hyderabad as the top
destination for IT-enabled service businesses
among eight Indian cities (World Bank 2004).
While AP’s economy as a whole has grown at a
rate slightly below the national average
Hyderabad’s economy has grown much more
rapidly than the average growth rate of all Indian
cities. The population has been increasing at 3.84
percent per annum during the last 25 years and is
expected to rise up to more than 7.5 million by
2015, taking it from thirty-first to the twenty-
second largest city in the world (van Rooijen
2004; United Nations 2002).
Hyderabad is located in a drought-prone area
and, despite recent economic success, water
supply has fallen behind demand. Per capita
supply is little more than 90-100 l/c/d (including
non-revenue water) and rationing is pervasive.
The major water source has been the Godavari
river basin (Manjira river tributary), supplemented
by overexploited groundwater. More recently,
Phase 1/1 of a major new project drawing water
from the Krishna river and involving a 400-m
pumping head has come on stream, delivering an
initial 0.205 Mm3/day and increasing supply by 31
percent over the 2001 total of 0.66 Mm3. By
2021, when Phase III/3 is scheduled for
completion, the project should deliver 1.23 Mm3/
day (450 Mm3/yr), almost trebling total supply
and, independent of any other projects,
augmenting per capita supplies to perhaps 150 l/
c/d if population growth remains at 3 percent per
annum (GOAP 2004; van Rooijen 2004).
While the Godavari river is relatively in
surplus, and the multipurpose Singur dam has
exploited unutilized flows, the Krishna river is now
getting overcommitted in the dry season (with
recurring shortages in the lower basins since 2000)
and is disputed by three states. The Krishna
Tribunal allotted 22.6 Bm3 (or 39%) of the 75
percent dependable flow to Andhra Pradesh (AP)
so that in 2021 Hyderabad should account for no
more than about 2 percent of AP’s dependable
share. Nevertheless diversion from Sri Sailem LB
canal to Hyderabad is located upstream of the 0.9
million hectare (Mha) Nagarjunasagar and 0.5 Mha
Krishna delta irrigation projects. As development
proceeds, not only in AP but also in Maharashtra
and Karnataka, these tail-end systems will face
declining supplies, especially during dry years. No
mention was made of Hyderabad Water Supply in
the Tribunal’s report because Hyderabad was not
an issue at that time (1976), yet it can be
expected to receive priority at times of shortage,
with the tail-end irrigation systems unlikely to
receive any compensation as their supplies
dwindle.
Visakhapatnam. Visakhapatnam has been
identified as one of the key regions for
development in Andhra Pradesh. Many industries
and mega infrastructural projects are planned in
the region, in addition to the existing industrial
park that includes Visakhapatnam Steel Plant,
NTPC Power Plant and the Parvada Industrial
Development Area. These industries as well as
the city draw water from two major sources of
water, the Yeleru and the Raiwada reservoirs,
which are also used by farmers. The
Vishakhapatnam Industrial Water Supply Project
envisages capacity augmentation of the existing
153 km long Yeleru Left Bank Canal (YLBC)
system that presently delivers about 180 Ml/day
of water from the Yeleru reservoir to
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant (VSP). The demand
in the immediate future is estimated at 260 Ml/
day (2006), which in the long run would increase
to 600 Ml/day (Business Line 2003). The solution
eventually adopted is to build a pumping and
diversion scheme from the Godavari river to
increase supply into the tank. The cost of that
investment (Rs 3,000 million) is to be partly borne
by the industrial group. This example shows that
a costly solution has been preferred to the
political costs attached to expropriation of local
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farmers, in this case because it is to be largely
paid by private interests and also because the
impact of the abstraction of water from the
Godavari is more dispersed and less visible,
although likely to be significant in times of
drought.
Kerala. A much publicized example of conflict
between industry and agriculture is that between
a Coca-Cola plant in the Pallakad district, Kerala
and surrounding farmers. The uncontrolled
abstraction of groundwater by the bottling
company has depleted the aquifer, dried up
several open wells and bore wells and turned the
quality of water from nearby wells unfit for
consumption (Surendranath 2003). An area of 250
hectares of wet paddy land was reported dry.
While the respective impacts of the factory, the
past drought and the development of bore wells
for agriculture are still a matter for contention, it
must be noted that the matter was made worse
by the lack of transparent information on the
effective use of water by the factory.43 The
Government of Kerala, based on the critical
drought situation in the region, ordered a ban on
groundwater use from February to June 2004.
Delhi. Delhi is also trying to catch up with the
demand of a sprawling and rapidly expanding city.
It can access only about 6 percent of flows in the
Yamuna river due to upstream diversions by the
states of Uttar Pradesh and Haryana (GNCTD
2003). The Sonia Vihar water treatment plant,
which is to treat 0.635 Mm3/day (232 Mm3/yr)
from the Ganges river, was inaugurated in June
2002. Treated water is to be piped to Delhi, at a
time when the capital is approaching a population
of 15 million and consumes 742 Mm3/yr, against
a real “demand” estimated at 1,200 Mm3/yr. Water
is taken from the Upper Ganga irrigation canal,
which has been lined to avoid seepage, raising
protests from farmers relying on groundwater in
the canal’s vicinity and emotional statements
from social activists who see food security in the
area threatened (Shiva et al. 2002). Although
lining is intended to “save” water it is apparent that
the operation amounts to a seemingly invisible
reallocation of water from well users to the city.
FIGURE 2.
Water pipes (from the Krishna river to Hyderabad; from Disi aquifer to Amman).
43While estimates based on pumping capacity are 0.8 million liters per hour, factory officials claim they abstract only 0.3–0.6 million
liters per day.
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Nepal
Katmandu. In Katmandu, the water supply
system covers less than 70 percent of city
residents with 3 to 4 hours of water supply during
the monsoon, and 1–2 hours on alternate days
during the rest of the dry season (Bhattarai et al.
2002a). To alleviate this shortage and satisfy
growth in demand and population, water is to be
transferred from the nearby Melamchi river. The
project plans to divert 62 Mm3/yr to Katmandu
city’s drinking water network through a 26.5-km
tunnel. This new supply is drawn from a
neighboring surplus basin and its impact is
expected to be limited to 75 rice farmers and 15
water mill owners during the driest months
(Bhattarai et al. 2002a; 2002b). Katmandu is thus
in a position to satisfy its needs with little impact
on rural areas (but how to compensate the
affected farmers and mill owners remains an
issue). Despite low indices of water supply, the
problem is one of high cost and economic
scarcity rather than of sectoral competition.
Pakistan
Major cities such as Lahore and Karachi use both
underground and canal water. Urban and industrial
sprawl coexist with katchi abadis (squatter
settlements) in which 50 percent of the population
live and where riots for lack of water supply have
already been observed (Kamal et al. 2004). With
43 percent of supply unfiltered, 60 percent of
effluents not treated, 7 percent only of the 1.1
million consumers paying bills, thriving water
theft,44 very high coastal pollution and no
untapped water sources at its disposal for future
growth are severe problems Karachi is faced with
(URC 2004; Ercelawn 1999).
Karachi. Karachi uses 5.5 Mm3/day, which is
almost totally coming from the Indus or its
tributaries (McIntosh 2003). A new project (K-III)
to divert an additional 0.45 Mm3/day from Kinjhar
lake is in its completion stage. A director at the
Karachi Water and Sewerage Board (KWSB)
declared that “the drinking water supply will not
be affected due to lack of water in the Indus
river, as the level of the Kinjhar lake was being
properly maintained to keep up the flow of water
stream into the Kinjhar-Gujo canal for supply to
Karachi.” Yet, recent reports state that the Kinjhar
lake level has declined to its lowest level and
only supplies water to Karachi through the
Kinjhar-Gujo canal. All other canals are closed to
ensure water supply for Karachi (Hi Pakistan
2004). Similar competition exists in respect of the
Hub dam, which provides, on average, 195 Mm3
to irrigation and 455 Mm3 to Karachi. A further
project (K-IV) is to divert more water from Kinjhar
lake and exploration of groundwater resources is
also planned (Government of Sindh 2003). As a
result of cumulative diversions of the Indus, the
delta is now becoming a wasteland, and seawater
intrusion is now well established in some areas
(Kamal 2001).
Middle East and North Africa
Iran
Isfahan. The population of Isfahan in the
Zayandeh Rud basin rose from about 45,000 in
1966 to a current level of about 1.5 million. It has
secured water and sustained its growth, including
activities like a steel industry, by augmenting
supplies through trans-basin diversion from the
Karum basin and, at times, implicitly reducing
supplies to agriculture (Murray-Rust and Droogers
2004). The resources of the basin are now piped
to cities outside of the basin, notably Yazd (78
Mm3/year) and, in the future to Kashan and Shahr
Kurd as well (Mourid 2003). The development of
the city is hardly constrained by lack of water.
Industries providing jobs get the water they need,
paying for water at a much higher rate than
agriculture they (industries) qualify as priority
clients of the Isfahan Water Authority. In times of
44 “Water theft in Karachi is an organized crime. It exists in many ways. Stealing water by puncturing main siphons outside Karachi’s
limits, inserting illegal water connections from lane-level lines, obtaining water from the connections of bulk consumers and using high-
powered suction pumps are a few common forms of water thefts” (URC 2004).
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drought, water supply to agriculture is curtailed.
While its (agriculture) share is around 78 percent
in a normal year it was reduced to zero in 2001,
which was the last year of a critical 3-year
drought.45 Despite scarcity at the basin level, with
all resources already committed, green belts,
extensive lawns along the river and other
vegetated areas continue to expand in the city. In
2001, urban interests demanded and obtained
releases from the main storage dam to ensure
sufficient water under the city’s magnificent
ancient bridges in order to meet the interests of
the tourist industry. In short, while by and large
an oasis, Isfahan could acquire the increasing
supply it needs, partly because of expensive
interbasin diversions through tunnels, and partly
by relegating agriculture to the use of groundwater
(which now makes up to 50–60% of its total
supply).
Jordan
Amman. Domestic water supply in Amman is
intermittent and the city has a long history of
water shortage. The King Abdullah Canal in the
Jordan valley was initially constructed for
irrigation and diverts an average of 150 Mm3/yr
from the Yarmouk to the Jordan valley. The Deir
Allah pipeline was constructed in the mid-1980s
to lift 45 Mm3/yr of water over a height of 1,200
m, from the canal to Amman. Part of the return
flow is treated and returned to the valley in
compensation. Following an agreement with Israel
on limited additional flows from the Jordan
system and the construction of the Unity dam on
the Yarmouk, a second pipeline doubling the
transfer to Amman will soon become operational.
In addition Amman is to receive water from the
(fossil) Disi aquifer, located 350 km further south,
which is (over) exploiting groundwater. The urban
sector currently pumps about 145 Mm3/yr (plus 30
Mm3 from distant aquifers) against 130 Mm3 used
in highland agriculture, together greatly exceeding
the annual usable recharge of approximately 153
Mm3 (Courcier et al. 2005).
Reallocation from agriculture occurs both
where water is under government control (e.g.,
transfers from the valley) and also in a less
formal way where it is under individual
management. About one-half of highland
agriculture is highly productive and grows cash
crops which are sold in the Gulf countries, but
the other half supports unprofitable olive trees
(Venot 2004). Many have advocated reallocating
this water to municipal and industrial (M&I) use
(Schiffer 1997) so as to avoid more expensive
options such as tapping of the Disi aquifer.
However, this may overlook the cost of conveying
scattered sources to urban centers and political
objections to nationalizing private wells. Piping
these scattered sources of water to Amman could
be very costly since most are located close to
the Jordan-Syria border. In practice, a
spontaneous market solution has emerged,
whereby well water is transported to the city by
tankers and sold to areas with poor water
supply.46 The number of wells converted to city
water supply rises at times of drought and, so
long as shortages persist, tanker water will
continue to be supplied. Moreover, if the true
costs of Disi water, for instance, were to be
charged, there might well be a continued market
for tanker supplies at a competitive rather than at
a premium rate.
The spectacular growth of Amman (e.g., due
to the influx of refugees in 1948-1967 and from
the Gulf after the first Gulf war) seems to have
been little constrained by lack of water. Supply
lags behind since new sources cannot be
accessed as fast as population increases, but a
wide range of solutions have been adopted including:
extension of delivery networks, transfers out of
agriculture (with recycling of wastewater), drilling of
wells, transfers from distant aquifers and
45Agriculture had to rely solely on groundwater, wherever this was possible. Isfahan, however, also suffered as the water quality of the
river badly degraded, with impact on health reported in newspapers.
46Ironically, while this reallocation embodies principles of economic efficiency and private-sector initiative, this transfer has been prohibited
because of the competition it creates with the water utility under reform and privatization.
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reservoirs, desalination and repeated actions to limit
leakage. Conventional wisdom associates
Amman’s shortage with the fact that agriculture
still consumes 70 percent of the Kingdom’s
waters. A thirsty city is contrasted with an alleged
wasteful agriculture. But is agriculture really
wasteful? Transfers from the valley are limited by
pump capacity. Even so drip and other modern
technologies are spreading rapidly both in the
valley and on the plateau. And is the city really
thirsty? Lack of water in the capital is ingrained
on people’s mind by the fact that “people in
Amman get water only once a week.” But despite
this gloomy image, most people do get water all
the time by the simple expedient of storing it in-
house on the day(s) they are supplied. This is
akin to a rotation schedule in irrigation, which by
no means entails that crops do not get adequate
supply. Average supply is 135 l/c/day (Darmame
2004), which is a reasonable standard for an arid
country. Amman is hilly and it is hard to regulate
pressure; its network records 72.000 bursts a
year (Decker 2004). The main reason for
rotational supply is the poor state of the network
that would entail a huge increase in losses
(already at 30-35%) if it (supply) was maintained
(under pressure) fully and permanently.
Rather than a city being in thirst as a result
of water use in agriculture, Amman is, on the
contrary, an example of gradual reallocation of
regulated waters from agriculture to other uses.
This reallocation, however, is determined by
market pressures and feasibility. Recent water
crises have shown that agriculture is, in effect,
the residual user. In the dry years of 2000 and
2001, irrigation quotas in the valley were reduced,
summer crops prohibited and 1,000 hectares of
farmland “rented” to be left fallow, while no
restrictions were imposed on Amman. Agriculture
still retains the larger share of water in
percentage terms but only because other uses
have not grown sufficiently. Once water in the
Yarmouk is regulated by the Unity dam, the
valley will depend almost exclusively on blended
treated wastewater and semi-saline water.
Morocco
Planning has been effective in increasing
supply and sometimes rebalancing water
availability across basins. Since 1995, river
basin agencies have been set up to develop
master plans in a more participatory manner.
The growing needs of cities have, therefore,
been mainly satisfied through augmentation of
supply and conveyance infrastructure (and even
desalination), since quotas per cultivated
hectare are already at a minimum (Lahlou
2004). This, however, has shifted pressure onto
the groundwater resource, especially at times of
shortage, when domestic use and water for
animals are given priority. The increase in supply
has, therefore, largely served to dampen the
competition between cities and irrigation. The
efficiency of the latter is being enhanced by the
fixing of quotas, and by intensive reuse and
recycling, notably through pumping from the
aquifers.
Tunisia
In Tunisia, water policy is based on the concept
of interregional integration and equity. Regions are
partly interconnected through a network of pipes
that redistribute water from water-rich (mostly the
north) to water-poor regions, and from agriculture
to cities/tourist resorts (CNRS 2003), and
occasionally back again to agriculture (use of
wastewater for agriculture near Tunis). Urban
water charges are averaged and homogenized out
of a concern for equity. In such a system,
reservoirs in the north that had been initially
constructed for irrigation purposes have been
gradually shifted to urban supply. The shortfall
has been partly compensated for by development
of groundwater. Irrigation use still amounts to 80
percent of the total supply of water. However, 60
percent of the water used in agriculture is
groundwater (Treyer 2002). In the case of Tunisia,
therefore, urban supply has been given clear
priority and reallocation centrally imposed and
managed.
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Yemen
Water use in Yemen is estimated at 3.4 Bm3, 35
percent higher than the renewable resource (2.5
Bm3) — (Kohler 2000), but the situation is much
worse in some localities. The extraction rate in
the Sana’a area, for example, is believed to be
four times higher than the sustainable yield (Ward
1998). It is estimated that there are about 45,000
private wells in the country (although some
estimates are considerably higher) and about 200
drilling rigs (Ward 1998) with largely uncontrolled
activities. In other words, despite providing
significant short-term benefits to rural populations,
the pump revolution has gone awry. The current
water crisis is the result of several internal
factors (population growth at 3.5%, modernization
of agriculture through tube-well technology in the
1970s [Milton 2001; Ward 2001], subsidies for oil
and pumps and protective measures for qat
production) as well as external factors (absorption
of a population of 1.2 million expelled from Gulf
countries after the first Gulf War, mostly in the
agriculture sector, and the supply of cheap
groundwater-extraction technologies). In the longer
term, interbasin transfers involving high pumping
costs may have to be considered if a residual
agriculture is to be preserved.
Sana’a. The population of Sana’a was 135,000 in
1975 and is now about 1.4 million, after periods
where the city grew at an annual rate of 11
percent (against 3% for the country)— (El-Hamdi
1997). A total of 13,000 wells (70 of which are
state-owned) supply water to the public resulting
an abstraction of   around 250 Mm3/yr in the
Sana’a basin, against a recharge of 100 Mm3.
Water comes from both shallow aquifers and the
high-quality Tawilah deep aquifer, of which   80
percent is used in agriculture (World Bank 2003a).
The city is in a “long-term competition” with
agriculture, in that it mainly uses the Tawilah
(fossil) aquifer that is being depleted by largely
uncontrolled agricultural use. The strategy
adopted is to improve irrigation efficiency and
increase recharge of the alluvial aquifers so as to
relieve pressure on the Tawilah aquifer. However,
unofficial water transfers are pervasive via
tankers to agricultural wells to domestic users
(World Bank 2003b). Indeed, about two-thirds of
all water supplied in Sana’a comes from private
sources (two private distribution networks and
tanker trucks).47 Open discussions of rural-urban
transfers are highly sensitive, following the
conflicts in Ta’iz (see below). The World Bank is
supporting a set of realistic supply and demand
management programs designed to “allow time for
a gradual shift to a less-water-based rural
economy” (World Bank 2003a), hoping that in the
long run water rights and well metering will be in
place, paving the way for stricter regulation and
water markets. This particular case illustrates an
arid context in which a city cannot increase its
supply because transfers from other basins (or
desalination) are economically and socially
impossible, and where the common solution of
resorting to groundwater is made difficult by a
regime of open access and groundwater mining.
Conflict with agriculture is thus indirect, transfers
are partial, and the lack of regulation or water
rights prevents proper management of resources.
Yet, it must be noted that though per capita
consumption in Sana’a is limited, nothing
prevents the city from increasing its supply. The
crisis is in terms of sustainability and regulation
but, in the short term, the supply situation of
Sana’a is only partly explained by agricultural
use.
Ta’iz. It is one of the most water-short cities in
the world with only 36 l/c/day. In the early 1980s,
new wells to supply Ta’iz were dug in the prime
agricultural zone of Wadi Al-Haima, which is 20
km away from the city. Most of the agricultural
wells went dry, incurring drastic declines in farm
incomes and deep resentment among the local
population. By the late 1980s, the situation had
degenerated to such an extent that troops had to
be sent to quell the strife and restore law and
47Per capita consumption in 1992 in areas served by public water supply was about 120 l/day (including 35 percent that was
unaccounted for), against 35 l/day for areas dependent upon private suppliers, because of the high cost of water.
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order. Continued abstraction and further drilling
were secured through direct negotiations between
community leaders and the president of the
country.48 More drilling in the Habir area met
violent opposition from local dwellers. This re-
appropriation of groundwater only delayed the
crisis that was to strike the city in 1996 (Riaz
2002).
Latin America
Mexico
Lerma-Chapala. Lerma-Chapala is a closed and
overexploited basin, since the aquifers are
constantly falling due to the abstraction of water
by both cities and agriculture. Most urban
wastewater is now reused for irrigation. However,
the level of water in the Chapala lake, at the
lower extremity of the basin, is also declining,
impacting on its tourist, recreational and
ecological value (Scott et al. 2001). The 1991
interstate treaty allocated 7 percent (240 Mm3) of
the average basin inflow to Guadalajara city to
the detriment of agriculture. While this share
appears limited, in years and months of water
shortage cities become the priority users by law,
and this right turns out to be very significant. In
1999, for example, while 240 Mm3 were released
to the lake and to Guadalajara city, Alto Rio
Lerma Irrigation District had to reduce irrigated
area from 77,000 to 20,000 ha without
compensation (Scott et al. 2001).
Monterrey. Monterrey in the north of the country
provides an example of a city that is located
upstream and extracts water from a reservoir (El
Cuchillo), significantly and gradually reducing
water supplies to farmers in the downstream state
of Tamaulipas (Flores-Lopez and Scott 1999). The
dispute between upstream areas (the state of
Nuevo Leon and supply to Monterrey) and
downstream areas (Tamaulipas state and irrigation
areas) has been fueled by the fuzziness of the
agreements signed by the two states (Barajas
1999). Hydrological interactions and issues of
dam management have been overlooked and it
became clear that the El Cuchillo dam effectively
captured the water that used to flow to a reservoir
further downstream (Marte Gomez) which, in turn,
was supplying downstream irrigated areas.
Irrespective of the legal disputes and political
struggles that have unfolded since the
commissioning of the dam in 1994, the likelihood
is that Monterrey Metropolitan Area, the main
industrial center of the country, will not only keep
its priority use of the dam but also increase its
diversions in the future in order to keep pace with
its high growth rate (Barajas 1999).
Mexico City. Mexico City provides another
example of a city that grows despite insufficient
water supply (Torres Lima et al. 2000). Because
of its high elevation, interbasin transfers or
pumping schemes are costly and the city relies
on groundwater for 70 percent of its needs.
Overexploitation (45 m3/s against recharge of 25
m3/s) has resulted in land subsidence (on average
10–40 cm/year, with a cumulative drop of 10 m in
one century), a declining aquifer (1 m/yr) and its
pollution (WRI 1996), rendering water unfit for
irrigation by downstream farmers (Haggarty et al.
1999). A discharge of 19 m3/s (600 Mm3/yr) is
diverted from the Cutzamala basin via a system
that includes seven reservoirs, pumping to a
height of 1,100 m, and 21 km of tunnels
(Tortajada and Castelan 2003). This massive
transfer has had a serious impact on the local
population and induced hydrologic effects in the
area around Toluca, with the overexploitation of
the aquifer and the drying up of surface water,
including three lakes (Wester personal com.).
Further diversion of water from the
Temascaltepec basin (5 m3/s) through this
system is planned, but this project has so far
been met with fierce resistance from the farmers
48The communities affected received a package of public goods (Riaz 2002), and the local Sheikh drilled three deeper wells for his
family (Mohielden 1999); but implementation of the agreement (exploitation of new wells, in particular) experienced substantial delays
caused by spirited opposition from rural residents (Ward et al. 2000).
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of this very productive valley (Tortajada and
Castelan 2003; Legorreta et al. 1997).49 The
second major transfer includes tapping of
groundwater, which has been previously tapped in
the Lerma basin by a field of 230 wells. Its
discharge of 14 m3/s was reduced to 6 m3/s
because of environmental impacts and social
conflicts, induced by a reduction in agricultural
productivity and the reversion of some irrigated
land to rain-fed agriculture, without any
compensatory measures. Despite the escalating
financial and environmental costs, continuing
supply augmentation seems to receive more
attention than demand management: the
importation of 14.2 m3/s from the Amacuzac
basin is also now being considered (NRC et al.
1995). This would necessitate the construction of
a dam with an inundation area of 67 km2, a 160-
km long aqueduct and pumping to a height of
1,825 m, with corresponding energy consumption
estimated at 5 percent of total national power
production.
Average water consumption in Mexico City
Metropolitan Area is quite high (297 l/c/day), even
when 40 percent of losses are taken into
account. This value, however, conceals a drastic
variation from up to 600 l/c/day in richer areas, to
20 l/c/day in poorer parts of the city. Despite
calls for demand management, water remains
highly subsidized (5% of cost to supply water is
recovered through taxes), payment erratic and
service precarious (Castelan 2001).
Peru
Lima. In 2000, Lima received 8 m3/s from
groundwater and 21 m3/s (out of which 9.2 m3/s
for industries) from the Rimac river, that is 84
percent of its discharge (Peru 2004). Another 6
m3/s from this river went to 4,000 hectares of
nearby irrigated land. In times of drought, the law
stipulates that domestic use has priority and
irrigation is reduced. When shortage is severe,
the city too has to rotate supply. A plan to bring 7
m3/s from the eastern side of the Cordiliera
through 44 km of canal and 10 km of tunnel is
estimated to cost US$330 M (Lama 2000).
Additional trans-Andean diversions from the Rio
Mantaro are expected to add 32 m3/s (16 m3/s in
a first phase), as a way to meet projected
demand until 2025 (Peru 2004). Some water is
also to be drawn from the Chillon river, north of
the capital. A long-term decline in supply is
feared because of the dramatic recession of
glaciers in the Andes (Masson 2002).
Groundwater overdraft has drawn aquifer levels
down by 15–30 m between 1969–1992 and led to
contamination by saline intrusions and urban/
industrial return-flows (La Touche 1997).
Unaccounted-for-water amounted to 43
percent (two-thirds being leakage, one-third being
non-billed use) and only 75 percent of the
population is connected,50 receiving a surprisingly
high average of 236 l/c/day (with variations from
567 to 105 l/c/day between rich and poor areas)
—Alcazar et al. 2000). Sanitation is poor, as
shown by the cholera epidemic of 1991. Although
the problem seems to rest more with the urban
sector itself, Holden and Thobani (1996) consider
that Lima “suffers water supply problems while
nearby irrigation districts allegedly waste51
abundant water” and that water markets would be
a way out. In the late 1970s, Lee (1979) observed
that urban expansion had affected around 10,000
ha of agricultural land and that water use for
irrigation had decreased from 11.2 to 9.3 m3/s. In
fact, Masson (2002) recently reported that
agriculture had declined from 23,000 ha in the
49Tortajada and Castelan (2003) note that, in line with earlier interbasin transfers in Mexico (Tortajada 2002), the Environmental Impact
Assessment of the project did not consider the social impact of the diversion.
50 “About a third of those without connections relied on standpipes or group taps, another third on water vendors and the rest on
other sources such as wells” (Alcazar et al 2002). Masson (1991) also reported that less than 25 percent of the 21,000 industries
listed in 1988 were registered as water users.
51This waste is not substantiated by any reference but is hard to envision since irrigation has seen its part decreased in times of
drought and only the city’s sewers discharge to the sea in the dry season. Percolated water is also recycled through (over)pumping of
the aquifer.
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late 1960s to 6,100 ha in 1986 and had now
virtually disappeared! As the city expanded and
water became increasingly scarce, good-quality
agricultural land was both converted to brick
making and transformed into urban areas. No
compensation was offered to farmers for the
water transferred but their land probably fetched a
high price. The same process is now affecting
the neighboring Chillon valley (Masson 1991).
Brazil
The Metropolitan Region of “São Paulo” (RMSP)
is home to 18 million people and includes 39
municipalities (Porto 2003). It is located in the
Alto-Tietê catchment and, while it receives an
average of 1,400 mm of rainfall each year, the
city has been facing water shortage since the
nineteenth century, as the development of the
water supply system has always fallen behind the
population growth (Ducrot et al. 2004). In the
1970s, the Cantareira system, an interbasin
transfer bringing 33 m3/s from the adjacent
Piracicaba basin, allowed a relatively abundant
supply. While, at the time, this diversion had
limited impact on the then underdeveloped
communities in the basin of origin. The
subsequent development of the Piracicaba basin
reveals how transfers can hinder or preclude long-
term development in giving-basins (Braga 2000),
prompting complaints from the latter and claims
for financial compensation (Lobato da Costa
2003). Earlier diversions from the Alto-Tietê,
through the Billings reservoir to the coastal area
for the purpose of energy generation, are now
restricted to the flood period in order to avoid
compounding the pollution of the river (Porto
2003).
Further competition over resources will
translate into growing pressure onto the Alto-Tietê
river itself, which is expected to provide 5 m3/s
after two new dams are built (Ducrot et al. 2004).
The flow of the Alto-Tietê is roughly appropriated
by industry, agriculture and domestic use in
similar proportions and reallocation to urban use
is likely to occur to the detriment of agriculture.
Competition for land and water, low water quality
and uncertain economic profitability favor capital
intensive and high-tech agriculture and tend to
displace smallholders with less capital. During the
last few decades, urbanization and insufficient
sanitation facilities have led to the degradation of
the quality of surface-water resources (Ducrot et
al. 2003). The contamination and degradation of
water quality make it unfit for use and translates
into quantitative losses of potential supply. Public
outcry, however, has forced the state of São
Paulo to take action and to design the Alto-Tietê
Project, launched in 1991 with the goal of treating
50 percent of the total wastewater by 1996
(Hermann and Braga 1997). Challenges ahead
include conservation of water quality in the upper
catchment and in reservoirs, reduction of water
use in agriculture, control of groundwater
abstraction and negotiations with neighboring
basins such as the Juquiá, Jaguari, Itatinga e
Itapanhaú basins, from which transfers are
envisaged (Porto 2003).
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